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[Vetted List] Duterte names Mayors, Judges with Drug Links

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President Rodrigo Duterte recited a list of judges, mayors, policemen, and military personnel with alleged drug links. Some of names he mentioned weren't complete, while some were mispronounced. Thus, ThinkingPinoy decided to verify the complete names of these public officials along with their respective constituencies.

The people Duterte mentioned are as follows:

Judges

  1. Lorinda Mupas; Dasmarinas Cavite [Rap]
  2. Antonio Reyes; Baguio City [Star]
  3. Adriano S. Savillo; RTC Br. 30, Iloilo city [DG]
  4. Domingo Casiple Jr.; RTC Br. 17, Kalibo, Aklan [Star]
  5. Rene Baretta Gonzales; MTC Iloilo [Gov]
  6. Roberto Navidad; RTC Br. 32, Calbayog, Samar (deceased) [GMA]
  7. Ezekiel Dagala; MTC Dapa, Siargao [SunStar]

Mayors - LUZON

  1. Renaldo J. Flores; Naguilian, La Union [Gov]
  2. Dante Garcia; Tubao, La Union [MT]
  3. Martin de Guzman; Bauang, La Union [Gov]
  4. Marjorie Apil Salazar; Lasam, Cagayan [Gov]
  5. Cipriano “Goto” Violago; San Rafael, Bulacan [Rap]
  6. Marino “Boking” Morales; Mabalacat, Pampanga [SunStar]
  7. Felix Castillo; Langiden, Abra [Star]
  8. Eufranio Eriguel; Agoo, La Union [MB]
  9. Jesus “Boying” Celeste; Bolinao Pangasinan [Star]
  10. Jose “Pempe” Miranda; Santiago City, Isabela [Gov]
  11. Vicente Amante; San Pablo City, Laguna [MSC]
  12. Ryan Dolor; Bauan, Batangas [Star]
  13. Vice-Mayor Edgardo Trinidad; El Nido, Palawan [PT]

Mayors - VISAYAS

  1. Alex Centena; Calinog, Iloilo [Aksyon]
  2. Julius Ronald L. Pacificador; Hamtic, Antique [Rap]
  3. Jed Patrick Mabilog; Iloilo City [Inq]
  4. Betita Salagunting; Carles Iloilo [Gov]
  5. Mariano Malones; Maasin, Iloilo [Politiko]
  6. Michael “Mike” Lopez Rama; Cebu City [Sunstar]
  7. Hector Ong; Laoang, Northern Samar [Rap]
  8. Rolando Espinosa; Albuera, Leyte [CNN]
  9. Beda L. Cañamaque; Basay, Negros Oriental [Gov]
  10. Madeleine M. Ong; Laoang, Northern Samar [Gov]
  11. Vice-mayor Francis Alicante “Ansing” Amboy; Maasin, Iloilo [KYC]
  12. Fralz “BB” Sabalones; San Fernando, Cebu [FB, Rap]
  13. Atty Antonio Pesina; Iloilo City [Vera]
  14. Erwin “Tongtong” Plagata; Iloilo City [CPU]
  15. Ex-Cong. Joaquin Carlos “JC” Rahman Nava; Guimaras [Inq]
  16. Jeffrey Celis; Jed Mabilog’s spokesman [Sunstar], “Panay Chapter”

Mayors - MINDANAO

  1. Abubakar Abdul Karim Afdal; Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur [GMA]
  2. Gamar Ahay Janihim; Sirawai, Zamboanga del Norte [Rap]
  3. David Navarro; Clarin, Zamboanga del Sur [Rap]
  4. Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan; Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte [SC]
  5. Usoph Baunto Munder; Bobong, Lanao del Sur [MM]
  6. Jessie U. Aguilera Alegria Surigao del Norte [DCC]
  7. Sultan Fahad Salik; Marawi City [NDBC]
  8. Muhammad Ali Abinal [Rap]
  9. Camalodin Jamal Dadayan; Buadipuso-Buntong, Lanao del Sur [DCC]
  10. Sabdullah Tempo Macabago; Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur [KYC]
  11. Muslimen Macabato; Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur [MM]
  12. Datu Rasul M. Sangki; Datu Saudi Ampatuan Maguindanao [Gov]
  13. Montaser Sabal Talitay Maguindanao [ABS]
  14. Vicman Montawal; Pagagawan, Maguindanao [Rap]
  15. Samsudin Dimaucom; Datu Saudi Ampatuan [Inq]
  16. Norodin Salasal; Datu Salibo, Maguindano [Rap]
  17. Ex-Mayor Benahar Tulawie; Talipao, Sulu [UNCLEAR]
  18. Reynaldo “Andong” Parojinog Ozamis City [Gov]
  19. Vice-mayor Nova Princess Parojinog Chavez [Inq], Bilibid Drug Lord Herbert Colangco’s wife; Ozamis Mayor’s daughter
  20. Omar Solitario Ali; Marawi City [Rap]
  21. Vice-mayor Abdulwahab Sabal; Talitay,Maguindanao [Rap]
  22. Vice Mayor Datu Otto Montawal, Datu Montawal Maguindanao [P. Qatar]
  23. Bainida Dimaukom; Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao [FB]
  24. Arafat Salic; Marawi City [Rap]
  25. Mayor Hadjah Rasmia B. Macabago Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur [SC]
  26. Rep. Guillermo “Jun” Romarate Jr, Surigao del Norte [Inq]
  27. Ex-Bokal Ricardo Parojinog [TodayNews]
DUTERTE NAMES MAYORS, JUDGES, MILITARY MEN LINKED TO DRUGS
DUTERTE NAMES MAYORS, JUDGES, MILITARY MEN LINKED TO DRUGS
Duterte: "All Policemen, PNP personnel, assigned as security guards, security personnel ng mayor I have mentioned, you are hereby relieved of your duty and immediately report to your mother unit."
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Saturday, August 6, 2016
ThinkingPinoy cannot find records for a certain ex-Mayor Benahar Tulawie of  Talipao, Sulu.

"Benahar" may be "Burahan", a political dynasty in Sulu. The Mayor of Pata Municipality is Anton Burahan [Inq], but TP is not certain if he's the same person Duterte referred to.

The list of policemen and military personnel will be published in a separate post because it takes longer to verify each of the names. [ThinkingPinoy]

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Marcos in LNMB? Leni Robredo really is a terrible lawyer

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Thinkingpinoy (TP) started doubting Vice-president Leni Robredo’s grasp of law when he wrote “June 30 SOCE Extension? Leni Robredo used Obsolete Rule”. In that article, I showed that Robredo used an obsolete 2013 resolution to justify the Liberal Party’s late filing. Leni Robredo, a lawyer by profession, should have known better.

I discovered afterwards that Robredo failed the bar exam at least once [Inq], with some camps saying she flunked it three times. After that, Robredo condoned Pres. Aquino spokesman Edwin Lacierda’s #PisoparakayLeni fund raising drive [ABS], despite the fact that it squarely violates the RA 6713, or the Code of Ethics for Public Officials.
RA 6713 Sec. 7(d) reads [Gov]:
Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. — Public officials… shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly… anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties.

So ano ba ang intellectual qualifications ni Leni para maging VP? May pagka-shunga si Ate e. Nag-tsinelas lang, tumakbo na.

Then Robredo struck again.


Leni Robredo on Marcos’ Burial

On 18 September 2016 or just a little over a month from now, the late dictator President Ferdinand Marcos will be buried at the Heroes’ Cemetery, the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) [CNN]. Whether he should be buried there in the first place has been a topic of debate since time immemorial, and I, ThinkingPinoy, thought really long and hard to find an answer to that burning question.

In response, Robredo issued a press release today.

In an press release dated 08 August 2016, Vice-president Leni Robredo said:
“We strongly oppose the decision to bury former President Ferdinand Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani. How can we allow a hero’s burial for a man who has plundered our country and was responsible for the death and disappearance of many Filipinos?
Those who have greatly committed crimes and moral turpitude to the Filipino people cannot be buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani. This decision will not bring unity to our country; it will only deepen the unhealed wounds of the survivors and family members of victims of the terrible years under the Marcos presidency. Furthermore, his heirs continue to deny that these sins against our people happened. They continue to have no remorse and still prevent the return of the wealth that they stole.
It is our responsibility to teach our children the heroism and sacrifice of our forefathers. And Mr. Marcos is no hero.”

Drama aside, let's examine Robredo's statement.
In this press release, Robredo gave four reasons why Marcos shouldn’t be buried in LNMB:
  • Marcos committed plunder
  • Marcos used torture and ordered killings
  • Marcos’ family deny these allegations.
  • Marcos’ family refuse to return ill-gotten wealth.

Before we go any further, let me categorically state that I hate Ferdinand Marcos and his family, I made that plenty clear in “Robredo-versus-Marcos and Philippine Society at Large”. However, in controversial issues like these are best discussed with using an objective approach, like what I did in “Quantifying Discontent: An Analysis of the Bongbong Marcos Phenomenon”.

Specifically, let’s ask:
Do these four reasons hold legal weight? That is, can we legally prevent Marcos’ burial in LNMB?

Who can be interred in LNMB?


First, let’s cite the LNMB guidelines relevant to the Marcos burial issue. In particular, let’s take a look at “Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Regulations G 161-373, SUBJECT: ‘Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the LNMB’ issued on 09 April 1986 by the AFP General Headquarters under then AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Fidel V. Ramos and then President Corazon C. Aquino.
The document states [Star] that there are 10 categories of deceased persons entitled to be buried at the LNMB, namely:
  1. Medal of Valor Awardees;
  2. Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP
  3. Secretaries of National Defense
  4. Chiefs of Staff, AFP
  5. General/Flag Officers of the AFP
  6. Active and retired military personnel of the AFP
  7. Former AFP members who laterally entered/joined the PNP and the PCG
  8. Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1896, WWI, WWII and recognized guerrillas.
  9. Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense.
  10. Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense, widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chiefs of Staff.
 Categories for Disqualification:
  1. Personnel who were dishonorably separated/ reverted/ discharged from the service; and,
  2. Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.

Does Marcos belong to any of these 10 categories?


There are at least five (5) categories where Marcos belongs:
Category 1: Marcos received a Medal of Valor [Army].
Categories 2 and 10: Marcos was a Philippine President and ex-officio AFP Commander-in-Chief.
Category 6: Marcos is a retired AFP personnel [Army].
Category 8: Marcos is a World War II veteran [Army].
Now, recall that there are two potential ways where Marcos can be prevented from being interred in LNMB:
First, if Marcos was dishonorably separated, reverted, discharged from the service.
Second, if Marcos was convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.

First, on Dishonorable Discharge

Unfortunately for Martial Law victims, Marcos was never dishonorably separated, reverted, or discharged from the service, as such would have required Marcos to undergo a trial, something that never happened.

If Marcos was court-martialed [MCTC DLSU] that resulted in his dishonorable separation, reversion (demotion), discharge from AFP, the AFP would have been forced to remove him from their Hall of Heroes, which is not the case [Star].

In short, the first ground for disqualification does not apply in Marcos’ situation.

Second, on Moral Turpitude

Marcos and his family immediately flew to Hawaii at the height of the 1986 EDSA Revolution [CNN], where he died in exile three years later in 1989 [NYTimes]. He was still the president at that time time, and was thus enjoying immunity from suit.

Now, it can be argued that Marcos lost the presidency when Corazon Aquino was made president in 1986, so Marcos could have been tried for moral turpitude, right?

The problem, however, is that “Philippine law forbids trial in absentia in criminal cases” [NYTimes], so there could not have been any trial, much less a Final Conviction from the Supreme Court. Trial in absentia means the conduct of a trial in the absence of the accused [Duhaime].

The New York Times, however, was not very accurate in that statement.
Article III, Sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution reads:
“In all criminal prosecutions… after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.”
Now, suppose someone actually did try to sue Marcos back then, would “I can’t attend trial because the government and the angry yellow mob will kill me if I step foot on that country,” be an unjustifiable reason?
I do not think so.

Hence, a “conviction by final judgment” would not have been possible, so we cannot invoke the second ground for disqualification from burial in LNMB.

Leni’s arguments

Now, it’s time to examine Robredo’s arguments against Marcos’ burial in LNMB. They are so easy to rebut that I will only need two subheadings for this one.

First, on “Marcos committed plunder, used torture, and ordered killings”

I am pretty sure he did commit plunder, used tortured, and ordered killings.

However, the Liberal Party’s favorite phrase “Rule of Law”, neither Leni nor I are qualified to decide on whether he did that or not. The Rule of Law requires presumption of innocence until found guilty by a court, something that never happened in Marcos’ case.

And guess what disqualification from LNBM burials requires? A Final Conviction that’s not there.
Second, on “Marcos family’s denials and refusal to return ill-gotten wealth”

I am also pretty certain that the Marcos family did this. However, these are offenses committed by Marcos’ kin, but not Marcos himself. If there someone to be sued, it would be the Marcos Family, but not Marcos himself.

Now, we can still sue the late Marcos for those things that his family continuously denies, but then again, Article III, Sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution reads:
“In all criminal prosecutions… after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.”

Now, what if Marcos’ estate says:
“Ferdinand Marcos can’t attend the trial because he’s already dead.”

Would that be an unjustifiable alibi? I do not think so, either.

So no, Robredo’s two arguments don’t hold water either.

Let me make this very, very clear:
In my personal opinion, Marcos does not deserve to be buried in LNMB. However, he deserves to be buried there in accordance with the Rule of Law.

Why? Because legally giving Leni what she wants means disregarding the Rule of Law. By the equal protection clause enshrined in the Bill of Rights in the 1987 Constitution [Art III], that means everyone can disregard the Rule of Law.

Leni wants us to disregard the Rule of Law, so she implies that extrajudicial killings are okay. But she condemns extrajudicial killings, right?

There lies the contradiction, Robredo’s contradiction.

Yes, I am pretty certain right now that Robredo is a terrible, terrible lawyer.

Now, let set aside Robredo’s stupidity and ask…

What can we still do to prevent Marcos’ LNMB burial?

The irony of the entire matter is that it was Corazon Aquino herself who signed AFP Reg. G 161-373 [GMA]. She had six full years to revise it too. Her successor, Fidel Ramos, also had six years to revise it, but he did not. Cory’s own son, Benigno Aquino, had six years to revise it too, but he did not.

And Robredo had three years to propose a law covering LNMB, but she’s a terrible lawyer anyway. Add the fact that Benigno Aquino himself was a senator and a congressman, but he did nothing about it.

IF THERE'S SOMEONE TO BLAME FOR THIS, IT'S THE AQUINOS AND THEIR LIBERAL PARTY, WHO DID NOTHING TO REVISE THE REGULATIONS. MORONS. THIS BORDERS ON CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE OR WORSE, CRIMINAL INCOMPETENCE.
THIS IS THE SAME REASON WHY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO GOT RELEASED.

But the damage has been done, so what can we do?


Go to the Supreme Court and ask them to review the constitutionality of “DND Memorandum on the interment of the late Former President Ferdinand Marcos at LNMB [PresComms]”.

Leni, if you really are so passionate about not having Marcos buried in LNMB, go to the Supreme Court and file a case and ask for a temporary restraining order.

But I guess you can’t, duma-drama ka nga palang wala kang pera.

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Can Duterte really declare Martial Law? The faulty "insight" of Rappler's Pia Rañada-Robles

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Last month, ThinkingPinoy (TP) criticized Pia Rañada-Robles’ Rappler article “Duterte's first week as president: 8 things we saw”. TP said Cosmopolitan, a fashion magazine, managed to provide more insightful content than what Rappler gave.

In response, Rappler tweeted [Screenie]:
"We'd like to point out that the post you're referring to is a Rappler blog (it is clearly indicated in the story page). Rappler blogs are analysis and insight pieces from members of the Rappler team..."
TP tweeted back [Screenie]:
"analysis and insight pieces" EXACTLY the point. It's shallow insight.
Since then, TP makes sure to disregard all "insight" pieces written by Rañada-Robles. While’s Rañada-Robles opinions not exactly incorrect, TP finds them too shallow.

Note, however, that this is not entirely her fault, so...
TP READERS, FFS, DO NOT POINTLESSLY BASH PIA.
Note that the operative word is "pointlessly". Dahil kung may point naman...

Anyway,  Rañada-Robles struck again.

Hindi na nadala, humirit na naman si ate.

Sereno’s Letter

Let’s start with a short background.

In a speech on 07 August 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte publicly accused seven judges of having links with the illegal drug trade [TP: List]. Chief Justice Lourdes Sereno responded to Duterte through an open letter dated the next day [Star].

Sereno said several things in the letter, with the most important part being her warning that Duterte’s actions may interfere with “our sense of constitutional order”.

Duterte responded with a 20 minutes tirade on live television, with the most poignant was the part being his threat to declare Martial Law if judicial activism a constitutional crisis actually ensues.

According to Rappler’s Pia Rañada-Robles report, Duterte said:
"If this continues, pigilan mo ako eh 'di sige 'pag nagwala na, or would you rather I declare martial law? Pinapatay ang Pilipino. I grieve for so many women raped, men killed, infants raped tapos ipitin mo ako," said a visibly agitated Duterte on Tuesday, August 9.
(If this continues, you try to stop me and all hell breaks loose, or would you rather I declare martial law? Filipinos are being killed. I grieve for so many women raped, men killed, infants raped, then you put me against a corner.)

In fairness to Rañada-Robles, this was exactly what he said, but that’s not the issue here. Instead, it’s the part where Rañada-Robles offered her opinion on the matter.

Mababaw kasi ulit ang analysis.

Pia Rañada-Robles’ Opinion


ThinkingPinoy was a news reporter once. He vividly remembers that news reporters should report events as they are, without adding anything that clearly qualifies as a journalist’s opinion. That’s reason why Opinion Sections in newspapers exist.
Rappler seems to work differently. I don’t exactly understand how, but judging from Rappler’s Google Meta Tag, “News | Multimedia | Citizen Journalism | Social Media – RAPPLER”, TP guesses that the “Citizen Journalism” part means they can add opinion.

In particular, Rañada-Robles added her own opinion to the report when she wrote [Rappler]:
But by threatening the Supreme Court with martial law, Duterte seemed to forget the part of the 1987 Constitution that says the declaration of martial law can be scrutinized and reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Now, let’s analyze that statement."Seemed to forget"?

Wow, Pia knows something that the President does not.Wow! All hail Pia!

Pia, kung magpapasiklab ka lang rin ng wala sa lugar, siguraduhing mong tama ka.

Here's Rañada-Robles going smart-ass against a President who managed to win the National Elections despite all odds.

'Eto nga kasi. Pia, huwag ka nang magpabida. Mababaw kang mag-isip 'teh. Hindi naman kita sinisisi, kaya lang, ipinagpupumilit mo e. Wag na nga lang kasi. ANG KULIT.

Martial Law and the Constitution

The problem with Rañada-Robles’ opinion, however, is that it’s too too naïve.

Before going further, let TP note that Rañada-Robles cited the wrong section of the constitution. It’s actually Article VII Sec. 18, not Art. VIII Sec. 18. Article VIII has 16 sections only. But that’s a minor issue, probably a typographical error, so it’s okay. Chances are, Rappler would've already corrected that minor error by the time this article is posted.
So let's focus on the issue. That is, let's ask...
How was Rañada-Robles opinion on the Martial Law issue naïve?

We start with a simple explanation of the basic mechanics of Martial Law declarations per Article VII Sec. 18:
  • The President can declare Martial Law via Executive Order (EO) whenever he wants.
  • The President needs to prepare a report for Congress within 48 hours, after which Congress decides to lift or extend the declaration.
  • The Supreme Court can lift the declaration if a citizen files a proceeding against it.
Then, let's ask...

What if Duterte declares Martial Law?

Now, suppose the Supreme Court, regardless of justification, starts meddling with the Executive’s affairs to a point where the Executive starts to lose its teeth and its influence. For example, if the High Court continues to publicly lecture the Executive on how to his job, like what Sereno did in her letter. Suppose furthermore that the President, the Chief Executive, declares Martial Law in response to the issue.

FIRST, the effects of a Martial Law declaration will be practically immediate, as evidenced by the immediate arrests of media men such as Teodoro Locsin Sr. and Amando Doronila per President Marcos’ Proclamation 1081 [Gov].

SECOND, a Joint Session of Congress (Senate plus Congressmen) may cancel martial law after 48 hours, but there’s one major problem: a supermajority of congressmen support Duterte [TP: “Plan B”] making a an anti-Martial Law joint vote impossible.

THIRD, there are lots of political butterflies in Congress so Congress may still be able to lift Martial Law.

FOURTH, The Supreme Court, on the other hand, can also lift the declaration, but with the requirement that a citizen files a case against the declaration. drafting the petition, plus writing the decision, plus delivering the decision for official receipt of Malacañan, takes time, so let’s say the High Court will take at least one (1) working day to lift Martial Law.

With these said, Rañada-Robles is technically right. Rañada-Robles, however, is practically wrong.

Tama sa papel. Mali sa totoong-buhay.

Why is Rañada-Robles "practically" wrong?

A Game of Technicalities

Here’s where things become interesting.

You might have noticed that TP meticulously included time frames for potential judicial and congressional actions. This is because he wants to estimate a minimum time frame where unabated Martial Law actually takes effect.

To lift Martial Law, Congress will take 2 days minimum while  the Judiciary takes 1 day minimum. In short, Duterte has 1 full day’s worth of unencumbered Martial Law.

Moreover, if you will take a closer look at Art VII Sec 18, there is no period of prescription for Martial Law declarations. That is, there’s no minimum time limit requirement between martial law declarations.

What does that imply? 


Given these, Duterte can just re-declare Martial Law as soon as SC cancels a previous Martial Law proclamation. Let me state this more simply:

All Duterte needs is a Xerox machine to put the Philippines under long-term Martial Law.

If the SC can manage to issue a lift order every day, then Duterte can just declare Martial Law every single freaking day too. Yes, 365 SC lift orders can easily be countered by 365 additional Martial Law proclamations.

Duterte can also pretend to not receive SC decisions, similar to what former Justice Secretary Leila de Lima did in the PGMA-NAIA incident [TP: Arroyo Acquittal].

That’s just crazy, right? Yes it is, but it’s constitutional. And even if it weren’t constitutional, the SC will take at least one day to say it’s unconstitutional.

What’s worse, an SC lift order will be something like “We hereby declare EO unconstitutional.” Thus, the lift order shall be very specific. If SC strikes down, say, EO 100, that same decision will not apply to EO 101.

Besides, who will be "requested" to enforce the SC order?

Duterte, and why would Duterte do that?

In this regard, there are only two possible remedies left: impeachment and People Power, but impeachment will not work because of Mark Villar’s DPWH appointment [TP: “Thwart Plan B”] and the supermajority in the House of Representatives.

Thus, we ask...

So how about People Power?

People Power is unlikely to work either.

FIRST, People Power happens only when it’s against unpopular leaders. Duterte is not unpopular: he currently enjoys a 90% trust rating [GMA].

SECOND, People Power doesn’t work all the time, as evidenced by the failed Iglesia-led EDSA Tres [Rappler].

THIRD, People Power, as the name implies, requires people… lots of people.

Combining Poe’s, Roxas’, and Binay’s supporters may create momentum. However, the pro-Duterte crowd can easily outnumber a unified opposition, judging from the crowd sizes in the Miting de Avances in May 2016.

FOURTH and most importantly, People Power works only if the Armed Forces defect to the opposition, just like what happened in EDSA 1 with Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos [Guingona 2010] and in EDSA 2 with the late Angelo Reyes [Star].

The problem is that a major military defection is unlikely because…

AFP Defection is unlikely

Recall that Duterte recently lifted the unilateral ceasefire with the NPA insurgents after the NPA allegedly attacked government troops, killing one soldier [CNN].

Some say this is proof of his fickle-mindedness, but they fail to see the forest for the trees.

Let's recall a few key points:
  1. Duterte said he wants to double their AFP’s salary [CNN]. 
  2. Duterte said he will protect AFP/PNP from lawsuits involving deeds done in the line of duty [Star]. 
  3. Duterte said he’d continue AFP modernization [Star]
  4. Blah blah Military blah blah blah.
And do you remember the scene when he hugged one of the injured soldiers?
Duterte meets soldiers wounded by NPA
On the South China Sea Issue, you, the idealist, want to insist on our "legal rights". That means risking war. That means more dead and wounded soldiers.
Now, are you okay with seeing more scenes like these every day?
EVERY, SINGLE, DAY?
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Thursday, August 4, 2016
Simply put, a large number of Duterte’s moves are aimed at maintaining the loyalty of the AFP and the Police. Why? Because he fully understands that ONLY THE AFP AND NOTHING ELSE can topple his presidency.

In short, the answer is no, military defections are unlikely. People power WILL NOT WORK.

The Bottom-line

Rañada-Robles is correct when she said the SC can lift a prospective Duterte Martial Law declaration. What she failed to realize (or mention), is how effective that power is in practical terms. This is the same reason why opinions (or “insights” as Rappler calls it) are best confined in opinion sections: so people can easily opt to ignore those pages.

As explained in the previous sections, Duterte can de facto put the entire country under Martial Law whenever he wants, as long as he wants. This is not to imply that Duterte should declare Martial Law. In fact, TP categorically hates Martial Law [TP: Robredo-vs-BBM].

The point, however, is that TP wants to encourage his readers to exercise critical thinking when reading news from “reputable sources”, because Philippine Media is suffering a crisis today.

Just look at how Big Media shamelessly ignored Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario's financial interests in South China Sea oil [TP: Reed Bank].

Let TP finish this article with a message for Pia Rañada-Robles:
Pia, please focus on the story you’re covering whenever you write reports. We do not yearn for, as Rappler puts it, your “insight”. This is not to say that TP is better than you. Instead, it's because Filipinos deserve better deserve better from Big Media persons like you.
Pagpasensiyahan mo ako Pia dahil mainit ang ulo ko ngayon. Istorbo ka kasi sa paglalaba ko at sa paglalaro ko ng Pokemon Go. Sa totoo lang kasi, mas interesting si Pikachu kaysa sa mga "insights" mo.

That's all. [ThinkingPinoy]



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Will Duterte cancel Pres. Marcos’ Burial at Libingan ng mga Bayani?

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ThinkingPinoy is staunchly anti-Marcos and in his opinion, Marcos has no place in the heroes’ cemetery, the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB). However, in “Marcos in LNMB? Leni Robredo really is a terrible lawyer”, I have explained two very important things.

First, existing LNMB eligibility guidelines [AFP Reg G 161-373] actually allows a Marcos burial. Corazon Aquino signed these guidelines herself in 1986, suggesting a major oversight on her part. With this regulation, Aquino de facto allowed her family’s archnemesis, Pres. Marcos, to be de facto called a hero.

Second, past four presidents – which includes two Aquinos – had all the chances to revise these problematic guidelines, but they didn’t. AFP Reg G 161-373 has remained intact for the past 30 years.

Chronic Negligence


I would have said it’s oversight if not for the fact that  the Marcos Burial debate has been raging for decades. Recent examples include:
  • In 1998, anti-Martial Law group “Never Again!” opposed Marcos’ LNMB burial [Desaparecidos].
  • In 2010, Bongbong Marcos himself requested then-Senator Benigno Aquino to allow Marcos’ LNMB burial [GMA].
  • In 2011, Marcos’ LNMB burial popped up again as various public figures commented on his (in)eligibility [Star]
  • In 2014, Sen. Chiz Escudero suggested a Marcos LNMB burial [Star].
If this Libingan ng mga Bayani was such an important issue to Marcos’ Victims, I cannot help but ask:
  • Why did the first President Aquino allow it by signing AFP Reg G 161-373? 
  • Why did the second President Aquino do nothing to amend AFP Reg G 161-373?
  • Why did NOBODY in the anti-Marcos crowd suggest amendments to AFP Reg G 161-373?

Baka hindi lang talaga naisip? Ewan ko ha, pero ‘pag bumoto kasi ako ng leader, gusto ko ‘yung may insight at foresight. Ayoko nung nauuto o may kamangmangan.

(TRANSLATION: Maybe it really is oversight? I don’t know about you but whenever I vote, I choose leaders with insight and foresight. I don’t want those who are easily fooled or are fools themselves.)

Let’s state this more simply:
Suppose you were diagnosed with early onset diabetes and it’s known that late stage diabetics suffer kidney failure. Despite the diagnosis, you still drank Pepsi like there’s no tomorrow. Fifteen years later, you discover that your kidneys are goners.

Would you blame fate, or would you blame your chronic negligence?

Duterte orders Marcos’ LNMB Burial

But it’s too late to play the blame game: it’s already 2016 and Rodrigo Duterte has become the president, and he has verbally ordered Marcos to be buried in LNMB. This was a campaign promise made in February 2016 [Rap], so Duterte is basically fulfilling the wishes of Bongbong Marcos supporters.
This Duterte campaign promise was one of reasons why I had to make a careful value judgement as to which among the presidential contenders I will support, as I myself was still undecided up to late February 2016.

Based on my appreciation of the February Situation, I was faced with the following:
  • A foul-mouthed Duterte who wants a dictator buried in the Heroes’ Cemetery.
  • A Roxas who supports illegal mining companies [TP: Roxas Crony] that murder indigenous Mindanawons.
  • A Poe who knows little [TP: Foreign Policy] and has strong oligarchic links [TP: Poe-Danding].
  • A Binay who is corruption personified [TP: Corruption].

Thus, in as early as February 2016, I have already made a political compromise by choosing who I believe was the lesser evil, and I chose Duterte. I think of it this way:

Marcos’ LNMB burial is cancer, and as early as February 2016, I have accepted the fact that no amount of chemotherapy will fix it anymore, so I moved on with my life and focused on things that can still be fixed, like rampant corruption and grinding poverty.

Walang mapagpipilian e. Kung basura si Duterte, hamak na mas basura ‘yung iba.

(TRANSLATION: I had no other choice. If Duterte was trashy, all the others are trashier.)

Will a TRO do?

Regardless, there’s still a small glint of hope in my heart, hoping that Duterte will change his mind. I have a glint, but others have a bright shining light fit for rave parties.  

Alam niyo na, baka mag-milagro?

(TRANSLATION: Maybe a miracle would happen?)

As I have explained in “Marcos in LNMB? Leni Robredo really is a terrible lawyer”, there is only one possible recourse to stop Marcos’ LNBM burial: a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the Supreme Court (SC), followed by an anti-Marcos SC decision.The flipside to this proposed solution is a potential issue of usurpation of powers. A Supreme Court TRO will directly undermine the Chief Executive’s prerogative on LNMB burials. And judging from Sereno’s open letter, Duterte’s patience on the Judiciary is wearing thin [TP: Rappler Faulty Insight].

The Judiciary is woefully short of political capital. There’s the contentious Grace Poe Decision [TP: Sereno], the PGMA Release [TP: Arroyo], and now, they have angered the 16 million who voted for Duterte when they castigated him.

Will the SC risk a full-blown constitutional crisis over this issue? Probably not.

Ginamit na kasi agad ni Sereno 'yung baraha niya nang nag-open letter siya kay Duts.

Duterte’s Prerogative

There, I said it: it’s Duterte’s prerogative.

We might as well throw all the legalese out the window. Right now, the decision to proceed with Marcos’ LNMB burial is solely up to him. Yes, no one but Duterte can cancel the burial plans.

Now, let’s ask: “Will he cancel?”

Various protests will inevitably be held in the days leading to Marcos’ interment date, and Duterte actually said he allow as many demonstrations as the protesters want, as long as they don’t interfere traffic [MT]. Their reasons for opposing the burial are similar, if not identical, to the ones forwarded by our globetrotting Vice-President Leni Robredo: Marcos plundered, tortured, and killed [TP: Leni the Lawyer].

But then, we have to remember that it’s Duterte’s prerogative, and Duterte is a politician. If there’s anything that we should have already learned about him, Duterte is a staunch pragmatist. He hates “rigmaroles” and focuses on things that yield practical benefits.

Take for example Duterte’s stance on the South China Sea. He knows for a fact that our EEZ covers much of the contested area per UNCLOS, yet he took a calibrated approach to the UNCLOS decision [Yasay Face].

Thus, a political analysis of Duterte’s two options vis-à-vis the LNMB issue is in order and his two options are to proceed with burial and to cancel it.

Tara, tingnan natin.

To proceed or not to proceed?

That is the question, but more specifically:
What will Duterte politically gain from cancelling the LNMB burial?
Proceeding with the interment is just a matter of keeping the status quo, as Duterte has ordered Marcos’ LNMB burial already.

Duterte’s core supporters – the 16 million who voted for him in May – can be categorized into three basic factions: BBM supporters, Anti-Marcos, and those who don’t give a damn about LNMB.

This is very similar to the Balay and Samar Factions of the Aquino Administration [TP: Roxas Rise].

Now, l will explain how these three factions will react:

FIRST, Bongbong Marcos supporters will view Marcos’ LNMB burial as a fulfilment of a campaign promise, so that will make them happy.

SECOND, Anti-Marcos Duterte supporters are well aware of this plan even before they elected that man. Yes, they will still protest, but their opposition will mostly be in principle, as they know this is a losing war. Most have already made the compromise on May 9th and are thus unlikely to withdraw their support for Duterte’s general platform of governance.

THIRD, those who don’t give a damn really just don’t give a damn.

In short, Duterte can safely say that the collateral damage on his support base will be sufficiently compensated by increased loyalty of the Pro-Marcos faction.

The party-list groups and leftists will vehemently complain [TV5] about the burial, but they too are aware of Duterte’s February promise, so they must have already accepted the compromise. They would be too naïve if otherwise, and nobody likes being called naïve.

Samakatuwid, generally na hindi maapektuhan ang kanyang support base sa pagtupad ng campaign promise na ito.

This leads us to the next question:
Which other major groups in the general Filipino population are calling for cancellation?

Who else calls for the cancellation?

There are three other groups that could possibly call for cancellation: Poe voters, Binay Voters, and Roxas voters. Voters of Poe and Binay, however, are aware that their candidates are open to having Marcos buried in LNMB [GMA], so the reasoning I used in the previous section roughly applies to both these groups.

Thus, we are left with one group: Roxas voters who staunchly oppose the burial.

For the sake of argument, suppose Duterte yields to Roxas’ voters, some of which resort to sophistry to discredit the old man [TP: 400 Deaths]. Will that decision win them over? No, it won’t. After the smoke has cleared, they will still oppose Duterte. Just look at Carlos Celdran, their flagbearer.


But for the sake of argument, let’s just assume that Duterte will win the hearts of staunch Roxas supporters. Unfortunately, a simple cost-benefit analysis using election results implies that Duterte shouldn’t cancel.
Roxas has 9.7 million supporters [GMA], taking into account potential electoral fraud [TP: Smartmatic], the number may even be lower. On the other hand, Bongbong Marcos has 13.8 million supporters [GMA].

Now, will Duterte risk angering 13.8 million Filipinos to make fewer than 9.7 million happy? No, he won’t.

ThinkingPinoy’s Takeaways


The Kübler-Ross model in psychology [Sanchez 2007] states the five basic stages of grief: Denial, Anger, Bargaining, Depression, and Acceptance.
The Kübler-Ross model of grief

I was in denial that Duterte was actually serious about burying Marcos there. Then I got angry when he appeared to be serious about it. Then I bargained by evaluating my presidential options, and I felt he’s the least evil [TP: Jalosjos]. Then after evaluating, I got depressed at the dearth of choices for May 2016, but I realized that life goes on. That’s why I eventually accepted the fact that Marcos may indeed be buried in LNMB. I do not approve of it, but I am resigned to the idea that it will happen.

I just take solace in what Albert Camus said:
Blessed are the hearts that can bend; they shall never be broken.

I understand and I support those who protest against Marcos’ burial, but I am already over it. We can argue all day about ideals and values and morals and whatnot, but I do not like arguing about things that will not yield tangible results.
If you want something changed, then think of a solution, then see if it'll work. If not, then think of another solution....
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Wednesday, August 10, 2016
I do not cry over spilled milk. I argue about things that can work. That’s what I do. [ThinkingPinoy]

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Ohhh... Rappler is liable for Cyber Libel?

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Last April Fool's Day,  Rappler joked that they will be hiring trolls. Fast forward to August 2016, it appears that they weren't kidding.

The Incident

A couple of days ago, Facebook user Dara Manabat commented on one of Rappler’s posts. He said:
“In 2015, while you were sleeping, Lumads were being killed, kids being raped (sic) by drug addicts, riding in tandem continue to spill blood of innocent people and Rappler headlines the following day is Kris Aquino’s lovelife.”
In response, a Rappler moderator, using Rappler’s verified Facebook account, said:
While you were busy making sweeping generalizations…
We reported on Lumads: (Moderator gave 7 Rappler links)
On child rape: (Moderator gave 5 Rappler links)
And on riding-in-tandem murders: (Moderator gave 8 Rappler links)
We suggest you sleep less and research more.
Paterno Esmaquel II's public post showing the exchange between Rappler and Manabat Dara.


In fairness to Rappler, they did report about those three issues. The frequency in which they reported on the said issue may be questionable, but the fact of the matter is they did report on them, so Manabat Dara’s comment is, at least at first glance, ill-informed.

What disconcerted me, however, was the way the moderator replied to the comment, because it goes totally contrary with Rappler’s moderation guidelines.
Rappler’s Comment Moderation Policy states:
“We are creating an environment where people can have intelligent, issue-based, respectful, engaging and fun conversations. While the Internet allows for free expression, we will also ensure that conversations are civil and respectful so that intelligent and thoughtful conversations rule.”

Yes, it appears that contrary to popular belief, Rappler actually wants “respectful” conversations, so let’s ask:
In what world does “While you were busy making sweeping generalizations” and “We suggest you sleep less and research more” qualify as respectful?

But it seems that Rappler personnel were not contented with one zingy comeback. Rappler really felt the need to single out the commenter – who is not a public figure – to feed their egos even more.

Rappler's Paterno Esmaquel II


Rappler multimedia reporterPaterno Esmaquel II felt that one humiliation is not enough for Manabat Dara as hammered the point with this public post on his verified Facebook account.
The image in the previous section shows a screenshot of Manabat Dara’s comment, the Rappler moderator’s reply, and Esmaquel’s caption that reads:
“This made my day (smiley) Salamat, Rappler!”

Just four hours after posting, this entry has already received 11,000 likes and 848 shares.Yes, this appears to be Rappler’s definition of “respectful”.

Alam niyo kasi, Rappler, okay lang naman sa akin na bastos kayo, bastos rin kasi ako e. Kaya lang huwag kayong umeksenang tila Birhen Mariang “respectful conversations” kunwari ang gusto. Hindi e, naglolokahan lang tayo sa ganyang drama e. 

What is Bullying?


Rappler, let me remind you of what “bullying” means.

The issue of bullying originated in schools, where the it is defined as [Gov.ca]:
“Bullying” means aggressive and typically repeated behavior… where… the behaviour is intended to have the effect of causing harm, fear or distress to another individual… or… creating a negative environment… [and]… the behavior occurs in a context where there is a real or perceived power imbalance…“

This definition of bullying is the basis of the concept of cyberbullying, with the only major difference being the bullying is done online.

In particular, Cyberbullying behavior requires four elements:
  1. Aggressive and typically repeated behavior
  2. Intended to cause harm, fear or distress or to create a negative environment
  3. Occurs in a context where there is a real or perceived power imbalance
  4. Behavior is committed online.
Now, let analyze the situation where the Manabat Dara as plaintiff; and Rappler and Esmaquel as the defendants:

FIRST, it’s pretty clear that defendant displayed aggressive behavior. The fact that the post was shared and liked thousands of times further exacerbates the situation.

SECOND, Esmaquel posted the screenshot to create a negative environment with the intent of humiliating Manabat Dara, potentially causing distress upon the latter.

THIRD, Rappler's Esmaquel qualifies as a public figures while Manabat Dara is just a lowly citizen. This shows both real and perceived power imbalance in Rappler’s favor.
Rappler journalist Paterno Esmaquel II also qualifies as a public figure, as he even had the temerity to request for a verified Facebook account, despite having no more than 3,000 followers.

FOURTH, the act was committed on Facebook, i.e. it’s online.

Rappler has published several articles about Cyberbullying.

Don’t you find it ironic that one of Rappler's people is a cyberbully himself?

Unfortunately, an applicable anti-Cyberbullying law still doesn’t exist in the Philippines, so Manabat Dara cannot sue Esmaquel for such. The Anti-cyberbullying Act of 2013 [RA 10627] applies only to educational institutions, and the Anti-cyberbullying Bill of 2015 [Star] apparently wasn’t passed.

Luckily for Manabat Dara, he may have another legal remedy available: he can sue this idiot Esmaquel for cyber libel.

Did Rappler's Esmaquel just commit Libel?


According to the Articles 353 to 355 of the Revised Penal Code [UN]:
A libel is public and malicious imputation of a… defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause… dishonor, discredit, or contempt...
In the context of the issue at hand, there are five basic elements libel:
  • imputation of a defect
  • imputation was made publicly
  • imputation was against a natural person
  • imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt
  • imputation was malicious
First Element: the post clearly seek to imply that Manabat Dara is ill-informed, that’s the defect, i.e. it was an imputation of a defect.

Second Element: the post are viewable by the public, i.e. imputation was made publicly.

Third Element: the post was against Manabat Dara, a natural person who even has a photo of himself on his Facebook profile page.

Fourth Element: the post clearly intentionally humiliate Manabat Dara, i.e. they tend to cause the latter be publicly viewed with contempt.

Now, we need to check for the Fifth Element: malice.

Malice is defined as “the intentional commission of a wrongful act, absent justification, with the intent to cause harm to others” [LegalDictionary]. Clearly, the posts cause harm to Manabat Dara as they expose him to public ridicule.

Now, the definition of malice requires the lack of justification, and Rappler may have the gall to use “we want to educate people” as an excuse. However, the fact that Esmaquel did not bother to blur Manabat Dara’s name and photo his post, clearly showing the intention to direct public attention not only to the issue, but also to the person.

Yes, Manabat Dara can possibly sue Rappler's Paterno Esmaquel II for libel.

Penalties for libel is Prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 600 pesos, or both. This is in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party, per RPC Art. 355. The length of imprisonment mentioned is from 4 to 26 months [SC].

An easy defense against libel is if the plaintiff (complainer) is a public figure [CCPC]. That is the same reason why I have blasted Aika Robredo, Karen Davila, Pia Rañada-Robles in my previous articles. That is also the same reason why I do not attack private persons.

Thinkingpinoy does not vehemently attack identifiable persons who have no significant means to fight back. Rappler's people, however, do, as evidenced by the public humiliation of Manabat Dara, aa private person.

Now, let’s analyze if Rappler's Esmaquel committed libel.


Yes, Paterno Esmaquel, this will “make your day”.


Rappler’s “Veteran Journalists”


ThinkingPinoy finds it interesting that Rappler itself threatens abusive commenters.

Rappler’s Comment Moderation Policy states:

Don’t forget, libel is a criminal offense. It constitutes but is not limited to “malicious imputations that tend to cause dishonor or discredit anyone.” We have ways of knowing so be warned.

That’s really funny, because that’s exactly what Rappler's Esmaquel did to Manabat Dara.

According to Rappler founder Maria Ressa [Rap]:
“…Rappler [is] a social news network where stories inspire community engagement and digitally fuelled actions for social change… We… promise uncompromised journalism... We are veteran journalists… ”

Paterno Esmaquel’s cyberbullying described in this article clearly do not inspire community engagement, and it does not inspire “digital fueled blah blah blah”. Moreover, in light of his one-sided articles about the South China Issue, his journalism is already compromised. So that leaves us with the last item: that you are a group of veteran journalists.

Rappler has interns but Paterno Esmaquel II is a veteran journalist, as his LinkedIn profile shows he was a part of GMA News Online and Probe Productions prior to joining Rappler.

But with what he did, Esmaquel may not deserve the respect accorded to people labeled as such.

Paterno Esmaquel, you are part of the Media Crisis. You are the reason why personal blogs like ThinkingPinoy gain attention, as the public's trust on mainstream media erode little by little with every biased article you write, and with every stupid Facebook status you post.

Paterno, April 1 ka ba na-hire?(ThinkingPinoy)

xxxxx

UPDATE 1: Today, Paterno Esmaquel has set his posts to private.

Rappler's Paterno Esmaquel has just set his posts to private. Oi, pangatawanan mo kalokohan mo.
LEARN MORE: http://www.thinkingpinoy.net/2016/08/ohhh-rappler-is-liable-for-cyber-libel.html
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Friday, August 12, 2016
UPDATE 2: The original article mentioned a Facebook user who may have been one of Rappler's moderators. The Facebook user has denied being part of Rappler. To give her the benefit of the doubt, TP decided to delete all traces of her in this article. Hindi ako ganoon kataray.

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Duterte’s War on Drugs anti-poor? Not necessarily

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Recently, Ifugao Liberal Party (LP) Rep. Teddy Baguilat said [SunStar]:
“The rich and powerful are given deadlines to negotiate their surrender, are accommodated in the PNP White House, gets invited to coffee and are subject to an investigation… But the poor, the lowly drug pusher or the addict simply gets the bullet. It seems like the rules are different with the rich and the poor.”
This is statement is ridden with so many logical inconsistencies that I have to point them out one by one.

"Rich and Powerful"

The phrase “rich and powerful” means they have private armies or, at least, have the means to gain access to weapons. The "rich and powerful" are more capable than regular citizens to resist arrest. Hence, policemen face a greater safety risk when dealing with these people. Why would Duterte risk the death of PNP personnel right away when he can demand surrender first?

Moreover, many of these “rich and powerful” are judges, mayors, and even PNP generals [TP: List; TP: Robredo], who exercise influence over the police force, the same police force who will implement a prospective arrest order. How can a lowly PO1 or PO2 simply arrest a mayor? Would Baguilat rather have Duterte immediately deploy soldiers, then everybody in his party will scream “Overkill!”?

PNP Generals, LGU officials, judges, and even a celebrity have been publicly shamed, arrested and detained. What else do you want? You want Senators? Duterte has been president for barely two months, you will need to wait.

Rep. Baguilat, huwag kang atat. Iniimbestigahan na si Leila de Lima [MT].

"Deadlines"

When he declared his candidacy in December 2015, Duterte made it very clear that the war on drugs is part of the pillars of his campaign platform, and it was actually one of the reasons why he was able to get so many votes. Duterte reiterated his anti-drugs stance so often that smartass columnists even complained about this seeming obsession. I do not have to cite sources for that: it's common knowledge.
Duterte has been warning everyone involved in drugs to stop what they're doing as early as eight months ago. Not just the rich. EVERYONE.

So what's the problem?

Baguilat didn't think that Duterte would win so he asks for more time to adjust?

Sorry, Rep. Baguilat, pero pakyu on this point.

"Poor simply gets the bullet"

This is another hasty generalization as Baguilat implies that the police summarily executes “the poor or the addict”.

ThinkingPinoy agrees that there is a real possibility that some policemen are abusing their authority, and Malacañan is already investigating this angle [ABS]. This does not, however, discount the other equally plausible explanations such as (1) drug lords trying to clean up evidence; (2) drug lords killing non-performing assets; and (3) Inter-cartel violence [TP: 400 Deaths].

When there are at least four possible explanations for a certain phenomenon, one has to eliminate three of them before he chooses one of them as the underlying cause.

Actually, Rep. Baguilat's task is far simpler than that. He simply has the to do the following:
  1. Cite a particular instance where a poor alleged drug pusher (or user) got summarily executed.
  2. If executed by the police, show that the police is not a drug pusher himself.
  3. If executed by an honest cop, show that the suspect did not violently resist.
  4. If executed by vigilantes, show that the vigilantes have links to Duterte.
So far, all Duterte's critics could manage is Step One. It never got any farther than that.

The Liberal Party has massive resources, as shown by the magnitute of Mar Roxas', Leni Robredo's, and the Liberal Party's campaign spending [TP: SOCE; TP: Campaign Planes], and their network of political dynasties throughout the country [TP: Corruption].

Surely, if Baguilat is so convinced that what he claims to happen actually happens, finding one single instance wouldn't be that difficult. If I were the Liberal Party, that's what I would do.

Rep. Baguilat, Hitchen's Razor, a basic rule of logic, states that [Hitchens 2015]:
"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence and that what can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence". 

All the evidence Baguilat provided was his word, so that means we can disregard his claim using nothing but our word.


Your logic and your party's diskarte is underwhelming.

"Different Rules"

ThinkingPinoy admits that most of arrests in this war on drugs involve the poor.

The problem, however, is the fact that poor drug addicts are more likely to commit crimes because they do not have the money or influence to sustain, manage, and conceal their habit. This is not a class war, this is a war against people who compromise public safety.

If a meth-head from Forbes Park runs out of shabu

The rich addict goes to the ATM machine, contacts his trusty drug dealer, go backs home, and sniffs the new packet. If he plans to go on a rampage, the security protocols in his posh subdivision keeps him in check. When rampages do occur, homeowners can cover it up, as suggested by what six exclusive Makati villages did last month when they declared that their area is “drug free” [Journal].

If a meth-head from Tondo runs out of shabu

Because he’s broke, he steals his neighbor’s new LCD TV, sells it in the black market, then buys shabu. If he gets too high, he can easily break into his pretty neighbor’s home and rape the shit out of her. Or worse, he can simply rape his one-year-old daughter, like what happened in Cagayan de Oro last week [SunStar].

Yes, most of the “victims” of this drug war are poor people, but this need not necessarily imply that the government deliberately targets the poor and ignores the rich. Instead, it’s because poor communities are more likely to suffer from the drug menace than wealthy enclaves. Moreover, when the vast majority of  the country is impoverished, wouldn't simple mathematics suggest that more poor people will be affected?

Ang mayaman, maraming pambili ng shabu. Ang mahirap, kailangan pang magnakaw muna. Ganoon kasimple. Hindi kailangan ng drama.


Epilogue

I strongly condemn extrajudicial killings, and I will support anyone who can provide sufficient evidence against the administration. Unfortunately, no one has been able to do that so far. Instead, critics of the war on drugs appeal to emotion instead of reason when hurling their accusations.

Surely, the Liberal Party has lots of high-profile lawyers on their payroll, so I wonder if Baguilat actually asked these lawyers if his arguments actually make sense.

Probably not.

Lastly, LP Rep. Baguilat's complaint about the "rich and powerful" being "accommodated in the PNP White House",  is a tacit admission that the the Liberal Party abhors VIP treatment.

Justice Sec. Aguirre, please take note that of that, as it may come in handy if and when you finally decide to put a certain babbling Liberal Party druggist senator to jail.[ThinkingPinoy]

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Aquino, Duterte, and the “Kill List”: A Comparison of Extrajudicial Killing Statistics

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Critics of the 2016 Philippine War on Drugs claim that there’s reckless bloodbath going on as the government allegedly employs (or at least, encourages) vigilantes to murder drug suspects, including innocent civilians.

But is there really a reckless bloodbath as a result of the new administration’s policies, or is the bloodbath something that the administration inherited from the Aquino Presidency?

Alam niyo kasi, nagkahalo-halo na ang paratang, nagkanda-bandwagon-bandwagon, kaya ang hirap matukoy kung alin ang alin. Tara’t linawin natin. 

The Inquirer Kill List

This claim obviously requires evidence to gain credence, and the Inquirer is here to save the day.

Updated twice a week since 07 July 2016, The Philippine Daily Inquirer describes its infamous “Kill List” as “an attempt to document the names and other particulars of the casualties in the Duterte administration’s war on crimes”.

This “Kill List” is often used to justify the claim that there is a bloodbath in the Philippines today [IBTimes]. This Kill List is the primary basis of criticisms of human rights and anti-administration keyboard warriors alike.

As of 12 August 2016, the Inquirer claims that 601 suspects have been killed as result of Duterte’s crime-fighting policy.
There’s a fundamental problem in Inquirer's methodology.

Unlike ThinkingPinoy’s posts, none of the of the 601 entries link to a specific news article, making verification difficult. The Kill List also contains extremely vague entries such as “2:00 a.m. | Unidentified suspect #203, alleged robbers | Manila, Metro Manila | Killed in police shootout”. How can anyone verify that? Do Inquirer’s web developers find it too difficult to use hyperlinks?

In short, for the common Filipino, the truthfulness of this list basically rests upon the Inquirer’s reputation, something that’s very hard to rely on, especially since Inquirer has conflicts of interest. In particular, Inquirer CEO Sandy Prieto-Romualdez [Inq] is married to Benjamin Philip G. Romualdez, the president of the Chamber of Mines [CoM].

We all know that Duterte is excruciatingly tough on mining [Reuters], so I find it difficult to take Inquirer’s word for it when the fact of the matter is that Duterte’s downfall will benefit their CEO’s interests.

In short, gusto Inquirer na maniwala tayo sa Kill List dahil “BASTA!” Eh pano kung gusto ng Inq CEO na bumagsak si Duterte para happy-happy sila sa mining? Pero sige, patulan natin ang Kill List na ito at tingnan natin kung may point ba o wala.

The Rage is from the “The Surge”

What’s most striking is Inquirer’s statement, “The surge in the killing of suspected criminals since June 30, 2016, has been marked and unmistakable. “

If there was no surge, then the 601 wouldn’t have been as big a deal as it is right now, as that would imply that Duterte simply has to clean up the mess that he inherited from Aquino. Thus, the entire argument of “Duterte is a f*cking killer” rests on the premise that ““The surge in the killing of suspected criminals since June 30, 2016, has been marked and unmistakable.“
But what exactly does “surge” mean anyway?

Dictionary.com defines“surge” as “a sudden, strong increase”. That is, the premise that there’s a surge requires proof of a “a sudden, strong increase”.

Demonstrating “a sudden, strong increase” requires two things:
  1. The assumption that the previous administration has been doing a pretty decent job in addressing criminality so there aren’t a lot of criminals to deal with by June 30th, and,
  2. A comparison in the total number of killings of suspected criminals is markedly higher than a previous period.

Now, let’s examine if these two assumptions correspond to reality.

Assumption 1: PNP Performance before Duterte


The first assumption – the PNP has been doing a good job before Duterte – is essential for a surge to occur, as it would imply that Duterte didn’t inherit an accumulation of crime arising from uncompleted Aquino-era police work. After all, if the Aquino administration was “Noynoying” on crime, there will be a surge in such deaths if Duterte starts working, but that surge would be understandable, and the rage wouldn’t be as much as it is now.

The problem, however, is that first assumption is questionable, as the PNP itself admitted in 2014 that it was doctoring crime statistics to meet DILG Secretary Mar Roxas’s extremely high standards. For example, when asked in 2014 why he fired NCR police chiefs, Roxas said, “All I know is that the present statistics is not acceptable… that’s why we decided that maybe it’s time for new leadership.” Roxas added [TP: Lambat-Sibat].

In an August 2015 Senate hearing , PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) Chief Benjamin Magalong admitted that Oplan Lambat-Sibat exerts severe pressure on each local police station to lower their crime rates [Interaksyon].

In the same senate hearing, Magalong mentioned several techniques that local police stations use to do that:
  1. intentional non-recording of complaints
  2. outright refusal to investigate reports
  3. usage of two different blotter books (1 for true, 1 for doctored)
  4. police-initiated unofficial settlements between complainants and suspects
  5. telling victims to go to another police station

With problematic PNP stats, how can we discount the possibility that the Aquino administration did so much Noynoying that crime has reached unprecedented levels?

Let’s set this one aside and examine the other assumption.

Assumption 2: Marked increase in killings


To prove that there’s a surge, the Inquirer should have compared the total number of killings of suspected criminals is markedly higher than a previous period. With 601 dead people in its Kill List so far, I ask:
  1. Is 601 deaths from 30 June to 12 August markedly higher than the total from 30 June to 12 August of last year? The Inquirer didn’t show that.
  2. Is 601 deaths from 30 June to 12 August markedly higher than the total from 30 May to June 12? The Inquirer didn’t show that either.
  3. Is 601 deaths from 30 June to 12 August markedly higher than the total from any month within the past 6 years? The Inquirer didn’t show that either.
The burden of proof lies on the accuser, so why did Inquirer all-too-conveniently fail to address at least one of the three questions listed above? If the Inquirer said “there’s a large number of suspected criminals killed”, I would have yielded. But how exactly can surge be called a surge when there is no reference point in the first place?

Yes, the Inquirer’s second assumption also fails. The faulty logic on Inquirer’s part should be making the late Inquirer chief Letty Magsanoc turn over in her grave.

Given these two problematic premises, it’s pretty clear that the Inquirer’s statement, “The surge in the killing of suspected criminals since June 30, 2016, has been marked and unmistakable,“ sits on shaky logical ground.

Hay nako.Pero sige, patulan pa rin natin.

Statistics onVigilante Killings


But now that we’re already at it, why don’t we scrutinize the Kill List a little further?

Aside from the ambiguity of the term “drug-related killing”, finding the exact number of drug-related killings in previous years would be impossible because that would require accurate reporting. As explained the previous section, those numbers are unreliable because PNP doctored stats during Oplan Lambat-Sibat.

Pano natin ikukumpara stats ng Lambat Sibat e dinugas nga yung mga number na yon?

Roxas was made DILG secretary in August 2012 [GMA], but his Oplan Lambat was launched in 2014 [PNP]. So let’s avoid PNP stats for 2014 and 2015, and use crime stats from 2010 to 2013.

More specifically, let us compare the number of those “killed by unknown gunmen” as reported by the Inquirer versus the number of those killed by “riding-in-tandem” vigilantes during the Aquino administration.

For those who are anal-retentive about the math:
  • Let X = “killed by unknown gunmen” per Kill List
  • Let Y = “killed by unknown gunmen” in a given year A
  • Let Z = “killed by unknown riding-in-tandem gunmen” in a given year A
Given these variables:
  1. X should be markedly greater than Y to show a surge. 
  2. Clearly, Z is a subset of Y, as there may be unknown gunmen who aren’t riding in tandem, so that Z is less than Y. 
  3. Thus, if we can show that X is less than Z, then X is less than Y because of the transitive property of inequalities. 
  4. If X is less than Z, then there is no surge. That would actually show a drop instead.

That is, if we can show that there are fewer killed by unknown gunmen per Kill List than those killed by riding-in-tandem vigilantes, then there is no surge in vigilante killings.

Tara't ituloy natin, konti na lang.

Digging Stats, a Little Harmless Math


ThinkingPinoy counted the number of instances of “killed by unknown gunmen/hitmen” in Inquirer’s kill list from 30 June 2016 to 12 August 2016. TP found that there were 144 such incidents over this 44-day period, this translates to about 3.27 vigilante killings per day (this our X).

There are 3.27 vigilante killings per day under the Duterte Administration so far. How does this rate compare with previous years?

ThinkingPinoy was able to find three precious Aquino-Era pre-Lambat-Sibat riding-in-tandem statistics:
  1. There were 1,819 riding-in-tandem victims in 2010 [PNP]
  2. There were 2,089 riding-in-tandem victims in 2011 [PNP]
  3. In 2013, 3,000 crimes related to riding in tandem motorcycle riders have been recorded in Metro Manila alone [Senate].
UPDATE: Some people tried to clarify if these "victims" actually died. 

Let me quote a report from TV 5:
Journalists were among those murdered by hired gunmen riding in motorbikes.

The latest victim was Christopher Guarin, 42, a veteran radio block-timer commentator and editor-publisher of Tatak News Nationwide, a community newspaper based in General Santos City, who was shot dead by motorcycle-riding-in tandem gunmen in the presence of his horrified wife early this month.

In 2011, the PNP recorded 1,700 crime incidents involving riding-in-tandem suspects with 2,089 victims. This is higher than the 1,565 incidents in 2010 with 1,819 victims.
So yes, they were murdered.

Dividing each figure by 365 days:
  1. The 2010 statistic shows 4.98 riding-in-tandem murders daily.
  2. The 2011 statistic shows 5.72 riding-in-tandem murders daily.
  3. The 2013 statistic shows 8.21 riding-in-tandem murders daily in Metro Manila alone.

Okay, hold on.

Duterte-era vigilante killings is 3.27 per day. This is MARKEDLY LOWER than 4.98, 5.72, and 8.21, which are the absolute minimum rate of vigilante killings during the past administration.

Okay, one more time


Let me explain this more simply.
There were 144 vigilante killings in Duterte’s first 44 days as president, per Inquirer Kill List.

  1. Using the 2010 statistic, there would be at least 219 vigilante deaths over the same 44-day period.
  2. Using the 2011 statistic, there would be at least 251 vigilante deaths over the same 44-day period.
  3. Using the 2013 statistic, there would be at least 361 vigilante deaths over the same 44-day period.

Let me spell this out in case using a table if you still don’t get it:


What the hell?


Yes, empirical data indicate that there are actually FEWER vigilante killings after Duterte took office, when compared to the same period in previous years. 

So nasaan ang "unmistakable surge" na sinasabi ng Inquirer? Tangina, wala pala.

At this point, I think those who speak against vigilante killings should not only fight for the right to life. They should also fight for the right to learn arithmetic.

Ang tatanga, syet. [ThinkingPinoy]

UPDATE:

With the plethora of illogicalities throughout Inquirer's "Kill List", ThinkingPinoy wonders why mainstream media even...

Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Monday, August 15, 2016

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Debunking Inquirer’s “Kill List” Part 1 of 3: Ten Illogicalities

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On 07 July 2016, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published “The Kill List”, described as “an attempt to document the names and other particulars of the casualties in the Duterte administration’s war on crime”. The list is being updated twice weekly, with latest being on 15 August 2015. Since President Duterte took office on 30 June 2016, Inquirer claims that there had been 646 deaths as a result of Duterte’s war on crimes.

Inquirer argues that “The surge in the killing of suspected criminals since June 30, 2016, has been marked and unmistakable. Most of those killed were identified by the police as suspected drug dealers or pushers (“tulak”).”

Inquirer’s methodology

At face value, “casualties in the Duterte administration’s war on crime” indicates that this list includes all murders since 30 June. If the Inquirer mean it to be worded this way, this list is essentially meaningless, as there is no distinction between murders allegedly perpetrated by the administration and those that would have happened with or without a war on crime.

If Duterte didn’t declare a war on crime, would there be zero murders? That’s highly unlikely. Aside from this, there are other glaring issues in Inquirer’s methodology that has to be pointed out.
FIRST, the problematic use of “surge”.
The Inquirer’s claims “marked and unmistakable” surge of killings since 30 June, which suggests a sharp rise in the number of deaths, is misleading.

Inquirer failed to mention a baseline figure, a starting point of comparisons. Claiming the existence of a “surge” requires the claimant to show that 646 deaths in July is markedly higher than, say, the deaths in March or in April of this year. To show a “surge” requires a comparison of figures, something that the Inquirer did not provide.

SECOND, verifiability.
The Inquirer’s claims are near-impossible to cross-check, especially since there over 100 entries that simply state “Unidentified drug suspect”, along with the fact that the Kill List does not cite news articles to back up each of its claims.

THIRD, heavy editorializing.
There are som e entries that suggest immense subjectivity on the part of the Inquirer’s editorial team. Let’s cite one of these entries:
“(05 August 2016) 11:00 p.m. | Dante de Paz, probably killed in a case of mistaken identity | Pasay City| Killed by unknown hitmen who might have assumed he was their target because he was standing outside the house of a drug suspect who had yet to surrender to police”
Notice the phrases “probably killed” and “who might have assumed”? Who assumed that the hitmen “probably killed” and “might have assumed”? The Inquirer? That is editorializing. That is, the inquirer is making comments or expressing opinions rather than just reporting the news.

FOURTH, police doing their jobs honestly.
The Inquirer included policemen killed while performing legitimate operations, as shown in:
“(03 August 2016) 9:40 p.m. | SPO4 Edmar Bumagat, among police who served the warrant against Tampos and previously a member of the PNP Special Action Forces | Makati City, Metro Manila | Killed while serving an arrest warrant”
Bumagat was killed while serving an arrest warrant. I am outraged at Bumagat’s death, but is the Inquirer suggesting that the police should not do its job? Is Inquirer a closet anarchist?

FIFTH, blatant false dichotomies.
The Inquirer ignores equally plausible explanations in favor of one that suits their cognitive bias. Take ths for example:
(09 August 2016) Evening | PO2 Miguel Turaray, who was being monitored by his policemen due to his alleged drug-related activities | Pasig City, Metro Manila | Killed by unknown hitmen
Based on what little information Inquirer provided, it’s clear that the cop Turaray is a drug suspect who’s under surveillance. He could have also been killed by one of his accomplices who have knowledge of the surveillance, right? The Inquirer should eliminate this possibility before concluding that the war on crime is to blame.

SIXTH, entries that came (or will come) back from the dead.
The objectivity of this Kill List becomes even more questionable as it contains entries that contain the phrase, “Reported dead on… but confirmed to be alive on…,” such as:
“(03 July 2016) Alias “Nixon,” | Lopez town, Quezon | Reported dead on July 3 but confirmed to be alive on July 7”
Unless they revise the list to include “confirmed dead”, the Inquirer basically showed that at least some of the 600-or-so entries may actually be alive. Essentially, this is not a “Kill List”, but a “Maybe-a-Kill List”.
SEVENTH, the kill list barks at the wrong tree.
“(03 August 2016) 8:00 p.m. | Jose Ipo, barangay chief known for his involvement in his village’s antidrug campaign | Naga City, Camarines Sur | Killed by unknown hitmen”
Jose Ipo is clearly a government asset. Are we blaming the government for something that is more likely perpetrated by drug cartels instead? Wouldn’t this justify a more intensified war on crime instead? This entry is self-defeating, to say the least.
Here’s another one, a double murder:
(11 July 2016) 8:00 p.m. | Francisca Cupta, wife of Ricardo | Cebu City, Cebu | Killed by a man they listed to be a drug user;
(11 July 2016) 8:00 p.m. | Ricardo Cupta, husband of Francisca | Cebu City, Cebu | Killed by a man they listed to be a drug user
The Cupta couple reported a drug user, and they were killed by that same guy. The killer surrendered three days later [CDN]. The Kill List is clearly an affront to Duterte’s war on crime, so how exactly did the war on crime cause the Cupta couple’s death? This makes no sense.

EIGHTH, those not on drug lists.
(05 August 2016) Claudio Barientos, not on his local drug watch list but allegedly involved in illegal drugs | Mandaue City, Cebu | Killed by unknown hitmen

If Barientos was not on his local drug watch list, who said that he is “allegedly involved”? Sure, it’s not the police, because it will contradict the fact that he isn’t on the watch list, right? The phrase “allegedly involved” seems to be a case of editorializing.

NINTH, actual malice.
(19 July 2016) 7:18 p.m. | Emmanuel “Em-J” Jose Pavia, Ateneo high school teacher and anti-drug advocate | Marikina City, Metro Manila | Killed by unknown hitmen, police eyeing his anti-drug advocacy as a possible motive
Aside from qualifying under 7: Barking at the wrong tree, this also qualifies under 5: False Dichotomies. But wait, there’s more.

Yesterday, Ateneo professor Emeritus Ruben Tanseco wrote, “Two possible reasons were suspected to have caused the tragedy, as reported by the PDI. One: his strong anti-illegal drugs advocacy. Second: He was helping someone who was being robbed when he was shot. [Star]”

Why would the Inquirer automatically include Pavia in the kill list? If he turns out to be a hero, the Inquirer would have already cheapened his memory. This is can actually turn into a libel case against the Inquirer for vilifying the dead [AbogadoMo], especially since this is a clear instance not only of malice, but actual malice, or the blatant disregard for the truthfulness of the statement.

TENTH, legitimate police operations.
Entries 4 to 9 on 03 August 2016 details the deaths of five bodyguards of Albuera, Leyte Mayor Rolando Espinosa Sr. during a shootout.

Inquirer used the term “shootout” (involves violent resistance to arrest) instead of “rubout” (outright killing). Hence, why should the Kill List rouse public anger if it really were a shootout? Does the public expect the police to just go home if a suspect refuses to surrender? Or worse, just to play dead when the suspect starts shooting?

The bottom-line

These are just ten of the glaring deficiencies of Inquirer’s Kill List, showing that this controversial list hardly qualifies as scientific evidence against the War on Crime. With the plethora of illogicalities throughout the document, ThinkingPinoy wonders why mainstream media even bothers to use this justify their criticisms.

Now, let me ask: aside from this dubiously-created list, is there anything else that fearmongers base their conclusions on? 

Or do critics insist on believing on the Kill List just because it best fits their prejudices?  

Apparently so. But we're not done just quite yet. 


TO BE CONTINUED IN “Debunking Inquirer’s “Kill List” Part 2 of 3:  US & PNoy vs Duterte
(ThinkingPinoy)

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Debunking Inquirer’s “Kill List” Part 2 of 3: US & PNoy vs Duterte

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In Debunking Inquirer’s “’Kill List’ Part 1 of 3: Ten Illogicalities”, ThinkingPinoy pointed out 10 glaring and widespread illogicalities in Inquirer’s kill list, making the document an unreliable gauge of whether there really is surge in killings as a result of Duterte’s war on crime.

The Kill List contains over 600 entries over a 47-day period, and the Inquirer argues that “The surge in the killing of suspected criminals since June 30, 2016, has been marked and unmistakable.”

A closer look at the document shows that this is an unfounded claim, as the existence of a “surge” requires the Inquirer to show that 646 deaths in July is markedly higher than a previous period. That is, showing a “surge” requires comparing statistics, something that the Inquirer did not provide.

Despite this flagrant deficiency, it appears that international media organizations took Inquirer’s word for it.

In this second part (plus the next), I decided to specifically focus on the claim that there has been a “marked and unmistakable surge in killings” since Duterte took office on 30 June 2016. I will do this on two levels:
  1. Explaining the situation that Duterte inherited from the past administration, and
  2. Comparing PH killings statistics to an "internationally-tolerable" benchmark.

Not just “Marked and Unmistakable"

More than just showing that the surge is “marked and unmistakable”, Inquirer should have also explained why it is “unreasonable and unjustified”. These two additional adjectives is the root of international media’s rage.

The Inquirer should have first proven that simply continuing Aquino Era crime-fighting programs sufficiently kept crime within a manageable range, which would eliminate the need for the intensification of efforts in the succeeding administration.

The Inquirer didn’t do that. Instead, it hastily concluded that there’s an unreasonable, marked, and unmistakable bloodbath going on.

if the Aquino Era neglected the crime situation, then Duterte would simply be cleaning up the gigantic mess that the Liberal Party left behind. That’s the possibility the Inquirer failed to discount.
I tried find why the Inquirer ignored this angle, then it all made sense.

Why? Because news reports indicate that former President Aquino willfully neglected his job.

The war on crime is a war on drugs

Drugs are the primary focus of today’s war on crime is the enforcement of the 2002 Dangerous Drugs Act [RA 9165], as over 90% of the entries in the Kill List are allegedly drug-related.

Now, let’s recall what I mentioned earlier:
The Inquirer should have first proven that simply continuing Aquino Era crime-fighting programs sufficiently kept crime within a manageable range, which would eliminate the need for the intensification of efforts in the succeeding administration.
Specifically, let’s see how Aquino handled the drug issue while he was still in power.

Aquino’s Priorities

The drug use epidemic has been here in as early as 2012, perhaps even earlier, as 1.3 million addicts do not just sprout from nowhere. Despite this alarming figure, the Liberal Party’s (LP) Aquino never considered illegal drugs as a priority of his administration.

Let’s take a look at the Aquino Administration’s priorities as laid out in his annual State of the Nation Addresses (SONAs).

The 2010 SONA did not even contain the word “drug” or “droga”, despite LP treasurer Rafael Nantes’ connections with the international drug trade [Balita]. This is also despite former Defense Sec. Gibo Teodoro and Sen. Tito Sotto’s claims that 2010 electoral campaigns might have been supported by drug money [AE].

The 2011 SONA mentioned “drug trafficking” once, but it was clumped with tax evasion, human trafficking, smuggling, graft and corruption, and extrajudicial killings. That is, he spent no more than five seconds to discuss the gigantic drug issue at that time.

The 2012 SONA contained only one sentence about drugs. Aquino reported 10,000 drug-related arrests in 2011. Aquino didn’t elaborate.

The 2013 SONA mentioned drugs only once, but only as a way to explain the general smuggling issue in the Bureau of Customs. Aquino didn’t elaborate.

The 2014 SONA mentioned drugs only once, but only as a way to explain the general smuggling issue in the Bureau of Customs. Aquino didn’t elaborate. Yes, same story as 2013’s.

The 2015 SONA, Aquino’s last, was just like 2010’s: zero mentions of drugs or anything of that sort.
What happened under Aquino?

For six full years, the Aquino administration never considered the drug issue as the national epidemic that it is.
Here are some of the things that happened during the Aquino administration:
  1. The National Penitentiary became a gangster’s paradise, where inmates rub elbows with the Justice Secretary and even Aquino himself [TP: Gangster’s Code].
  2. The notorious Mexican Drug Cartels entered the local illegal drugs market [TP: Sinaloa].
  3. The druggist PNP General Pagdilao experienced a meteoric rise in rank, thanks to Aquino and LP president Mar Roxas [TP: Robredo].
  4. The most honest cabinet member ever, Jesse Robredo, died in office [TP: Robredo]. As Interior Sec. Robredo theoretically had control over the police as head of the National Police Commission.
  5. By the end of Aquino’s term, 20% of all villages (barangays) in the Philippines are drug affected [MT], with 92% of Metro Manila Barangays are drug affected [Star].

While still president, Aquino was even given a list of big-time drug lords that includes high-ranking public officials. Aquino simply ignored the list, according to former drug enforcement agency Sec. Belgica [TP: Narcopolitics].

As of 2012, there were already 1.2 million drug addicts in the country [DDB] or about 1.2% of the 2012 national population [ABS]. By 2015, the number rose to 3 million [Journal], or about 2.9% of the 2015 national population.

Aquino’s criminal negligence resulted into 100 times more Filipino drug addicts today than there were infections in the 2014 West African Ebola epidemic [CDC]. There are so many Filipino drug addicts right now that it will take 200 years to rehabilitate all of them given the present healthcare system [Senate].

So, did Aquino do his job? No, he sucked so freaking bad.

And this is just the drug problem, which comprises over 90% of the Kill List. We are have not even talked about murderers, robbers, and rapists.

The Aquino administration willfully ignored the illegal drugs situation for six full years, so that it escalated into a national security threat by the time he stepped down.

A drug problem of this magnitude necessitates a response of similar magnitude, and that was exactly what Duterte provided. But...

Arrest-related Death Rate

Despite the magnitude of Duterte’s response, we still have to make sure that the PNP is not killing too many people in the process, right?

Let’s do that by citing some numbers.

In July 2016 alone, over 600,000 drug pushers and drug users [GMA] have surrendered or were arrested, and are being scheduled for prosecution or rehabilitation [ABS].

Now, the Inquirer Kill List tallied about 600 deaths from 30 June 2016 to 15 August 2016. Even if all these deaths were drug-related, and even if they all happened entirely in July 2016, that’s about 1 casualty per 1,000 successful arrests.

This translates to an Arrest-related Death Rate (ADR) of less than 0.2% for drug-related crimes.
DEFINITION: The Arrest-related Death Rate (ADR) refers to the percent of casualties divided by the total number of successful arrests, over a given time period.
Hence, we ask:
Is 0.2% too much?
Let's see.

“Every life is precious!”

Now, human rights activists would surely say, “Every life is precious!” – even I agree with that. But let’s ask:
Where’s the unreasonable and unjustified “marked and unmistakable surge”?
As I have repeatedly pointed out, this concept is extremely ambiguous. However, judging from the reaction of international media agencies, it would be safe to say that the ADR of Duterte-era Philippines is “markedly and unmistakably” higher than those in developed countries.

Of all current administration’s international critics, the most well-known is the United States government, who, just a week ago, “expressed concern” over the recent spate of killings [Star].

The US government essentially says that the ADR of Duterte-era Philippines is “markedly and unmistakably” higher than that in the United States.

Truth, however, is quite the opposite.

The United States Bureau of Justice Statistics [US BJS] recorded an ADR of 6.4% for drug-related arrests. That is, 64 in every 1000 people die in drug-related arrests in America. Yes, that is 64 times the arrest-related death rate for drug offenses in the Philippines.

Yes, the PNP's performance today is even better than the Americans from 2003 to 2009.

Even if there was a surge, is the “marked and unmistakable surge” unreasonable and unjustified?

No.

Was there a global media outcry on drug-related killings in American during those years?

No.

Is the international community basically implying that 0.2% ADR is too high for the Philippines, but 6.4% is just okay for the United States? 

Yes.

That’s just stupid. T*ngina niyo pala e.

“Every life is precious”, the mantra of human rights advocates...

If the Philippines had the same an ADR as the US, there would have been 600,000 X 0.064 = 38,400 deaths in July alone. But that’s not the case. There were only about 600 deaths during this period.

Instead of hurling vitriol, Gascon, de Lima, and human rights protesters should be kissing Duterte’s ass, or ....
Would they rather have the "acceptable" American ADR and have 38,400 dead instead?
There are abusive and corrupt policemen, but do the numbers from the Kill List indicate a trend that’s worthy of international condemnation?

No. No. A big f*cking no.

At this point, I ask, where is all the hatred coming from?
Oh, because you wanted the drug lord Mar Roxas to win, right?
F*CK YOU!
YOU DO NOT MESS WITH MY COUNTRYMEN.

Vigilante Killings

We are now left with the final issue:
Did Duterte’s pronouncements lead to a drastic rise in vigilante Killings?

We will answer that in “Debunking Inquirer’s ‘The Kill List’ Part 3 of 3: Vigilante Killings” [ThinkingPinoy]



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PNP Generals and PH Narcopolitics: Jesse Robredo's murder holds key?

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Stripped down to the basics, drug trafficking is a business, and the businessmen behind it are doing one hell of a job in this country. That’s something we already know. Just look at how many drug addicts we have right now.
In February 2015, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) reported that 92 percent of Metro Manila barangays are drug-affected [Star], while 20 percent – or one in every five – barangays nationwide are also drug-affected [MT]. In October 2015, PDEA even went as far as saying that 7 NCR cities plus the municipality of Pateros have 100% drugs affectation rate [GMA].
To make matters worse, more and more drug syndicates are entering our borders. That’s also something we already know. Just look at what PDEA said last year.
In July 2015, PDEA chief Arturo Cacdac Jr. admitted that West African, Mexican, North Korean, and Chinese drug syndicates originally used the country solely as a transit point, but things have changed. What used to be just a transit point became part of their market [Star].
To make matter even worse, drug syndicates maintain cordial working relationships with public officials in order to evade arrest or worse, enhance market penetration. That’s also something we already know. Just look at how PDEA chronically neglects to gather data about PH Narcopolitics.
In February 2016, PDEA Public Information Office (PIO) chief Glen Malapad admitted they “have no data to gauge regarding how serious is the threat of Narcopolitics in the country.” For the lack of meaningful data, Malapad said they can only pin down barangay officials [MT].
But...


Is Narcopolitics new?

Narcopolitics refers to complex web of relationships between drug syndicates and people in government. The problem has become so bad that the new Duterte administration considers this problem as a national security threat.

Attributing this phenomenon to sheer chronic government incompetence is just too easy. Besides, we can see how the past administration can be so efficient in mobilizing the government hierarchy to destroy its political opponents. Just take Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez, Vice-president Jejomar Binay, and most poignantly, Chief Justice Renato Corona as prime examples.

On the rise of Philippine Narcopolitics, there seems to be a willful negligence on the government’s part. But the past administration loves alibis, right?

The only possible alibi I can think og is the claim that Philippine Narcopolitics is some newfangled reality.

This alibi, however, will not fly.
In as early as 2010, national-level officials Gibo Teodoro and Tito Sotto have acknowledged its existence, with Sotto stating that some candidates’ campaigns may have been supported by drug money [AE]. 
The Inquirer reportedly said in 2010, “The good news is no (2010) presidential candidate seems to be funded by drug money. The bad news: at the local level, in certain areas… the influence of drug money is real; it makes business sense for operators to place or keep friendly politicians in office, and during elections not too many politicians bother to return cash donations.”

PH Narcopolitics existed even as far back as 2001.

Filipino Narcopolitics is nothing new, we have known it since the early 2000s.
In 2001, Panukalan Quezon mayor Ronnie Tena Mitra, in conspiracy with Chinese national Willie Yao, were caught transporting 15 sacks of shabu (methamphetamine) using a government-owned ambulance. Mitra even had the balls to use his Hyundai Starex van, sporting a special license plate marked "Mayor", to escort the ambulance [Star]
In 2002, former DILG Sec. Joey Lina even acknowledged that “Narcopolitics is… a coming menace” [Star]. Nevertheless, PDEA chose a path of inaction from 2001 to this day. Yes, we have no substantial PDEA-led Narcopolitics research for 15 years and running.

How did it get this bad? I do not have the complete answer.

However, One thing is clear at this point: Narcopolitics exists in local government units (LGUs).
SIDE NOTE: It’s interesting to note that in 2010, the Inquirer zealously pointed out that Narcopolitics has yet to infect national officials. What gave Inquirer the idea? Hasty conclusion as usual?
The developments of the 2016 elections suggest that times have changed.

From Local to National

Something that infects many LGUs will surely infect the national government as national officials claim to depend on LGUs for support during electoral campaigns.
In April 2016, LP Stalwart and Camarines Sur Rep. Salvio Fortuno, chairman of the House Committee on Poverty Alleviation, said Roxas has maintained the loyalty of the administration party which has remained the biggest and most unified political group in the country. Fortuno was confident of Roxas win because the opposition forces are “hopelessly divided” and have no political machinery [MB].
Fortuno, like many other LP stalwarts, basically believe that support from LGU leaders is the single biggest factor in winning the elections. That is, the abstract concept of “Political Machinery” is but a euphemism for solid LGU-led grassroots support.



Mar Roxas made this plenty clear as he allied himself with the following political dynasties:
1. The Romualdos of Camiguin [SunStar]
2. The Ortegas of La Union [Philstar]
3. The Akbars of Basilan [Philstar]
4. The Tans of Sulu [Manila Bulletin]
5. The Sahalis of Tawi-tawi [Rappler]
6. The Mangudadatus of Maguindanao [Interaksyon]
7. The Alonto/Lucmans of Lanao [Inquirer]
8. The Delosos of Zambales [Inquirer]
9. The Ortegas of La Union [Rappler]
10. The Pinedas of Pampanga [Rappler]
11. The Dys of Isabela [Inquirer]
Okay, let’s pause for a second and connect the dots.

  1. The first stipulation is that Narcopolitics have permeated local government units. 
  2. The second stipulation is that LP believes that support from local government units is integral to winning national elections. 
  3. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that narcopolitical LGUs support national candidates who will best serve their narcopolitical interests.

Yes, ThinkingPinoy can concede that Narcopolitics may be confined to the local officials back in 2010. But if the 2016 Liberal Party itself puts so much weight on the importance of LGU support in campaigns, then Narcopolitics has infected the national government for quite some time now.

The Liberal party should be aware of it because PDEA Undersecretary Grepor Belgica himself warned Aquino about the alarming state of PH Narcopolitics.

“PNoy said, di daw problema and droga. Kaya nag resign ako,” Belgica said.

PNoy ignores PDEA Reports
In a meeting with #PresidentDuterte, who was still Davao City Mayor at the time, PDEA ex-Usec Grepor Belgica said,"Before I resigned from the DDB... PNoy said hindi raw problema ang droga... Nagresign ako dahil delikado buhay ko... After submitting (a list of) 52 narcopolitics (personalities), e hindi daw problema po iyan."

LEARN MORE: PNP Generals and PH Narcopolitics: Jesse Robredo's murder holds key?
LINK: http://www.thinkingpinoy.net/2016/07/pnp-generals-and-ph-narcopolitics-jesse-robredo.html
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Monday, July 11, 2016

The same principle – the heavy reliance on “political machinery” – also applies to Vice-president Jejomar Binay’s 2016 presidential campaign [Inq].

Apparently, the Aquino Administration, virtually synonymous to the Liberal Party, is entangled in this drug mess. But how exactly?

If ThinkingPinoy were LP’s head, I will use resources at my disposal ensure LGU support. Conveniently, LP controlled national government resources from 2010 to 2016 [TP: How to get away with Plunder], so what national resource can be the biggest enemy of drug cartels?

The Philippine National Police.

PNP’s complicity

Let’s pause for another second and let’s state a few obvious facts:
Drugs can’t be sold on the streets if community policemen do their job so it’s safe to conclude that there’s something preventing them from doing so. Normally, these small-fry policemen will report this “inability” to their superiors so the higher-ups can do something about it. 
However, the fact of the matter is the drug menace has gotten so bad over the years, so the higher-ups are not – or are incapable of – doing their job, then they file reports to their superiors and and so on and so forth, until we reach a dead end: the PNP’s top-level management. 
The dead end is the group of PNP generals. 
That is, whoever controls this group controls Philippine Narcopolitics.

Who controls PNP Generals? The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).

Let’s recap:

  1. Control of NAPOLCOM is key to controlling PNP.
  2. Control of PNP is key to protecting narcopoliticians.
  3. Protecting narcopoliticians is key to gaining their support.
  4. Gaining their support is key to forming electoral machinery.

Yes, NAPOLCOM.

NAPOLCOM Leadership

The National Police Commission administers and controls the Philippine National Police. Its powers include the conduct of pre-charge investigation of police anomalies and irregularities and summary dismissal of erring police officers [NAPOLCOM].

NAPOLCOM is central to the quest on finding who the PNP’s rotten tomatoes are, obviously because it’s the agency’s job to do so. Prior to Duterte’s 05 July announcement, not a single general was implicated in the Philippine drug trade, so the question is, “Why?”

So has been controlling NAPOLCOM all these years?




By default, NAPOLCOM’s top official is the Secretary of Interior and Local Government (SILG).

Here is a list of DILG chiefs from recent history:

  1. Ronaldo Puno from April 1999 to January 2001 [GovPH]
  2. Joey Lina from January 2001 to July 2004 [GovPH]
  3. Angelo Reyes from July 2004 to February 2006 [GovPH]
  4. Ronaldo Puno from April 2006 to June 2010 [GovPH]
  5. Jesse M. Robredo from July 2010 to August 2012
  6. Manuel Mar Roxas from September 2012 to August 2015.

Recall that Lina said Narcopolitics has been rising in 2002, so that negligence concerning Narcopolitics research can be blamed on successive DILG secretaries.

DILG, Reyes, and Puno

We have several suspects at this point: Reyes, Puno, Robredo, and Roxas, and it’s time investigate.

Appointed July 2004, Gen. Angelo Reyes succeeded Lina as SILG. DILG, in those times, focused on the proliferation of the illegal numbers game “jueteng” [Star]. This, however, did not stop Reyes from addressing the drug menace.

Three months later, then-Senator Alfredo Lim delivered a privilege speech about the increasingly powerful Philippine drug cartel. Lim cited a spate of brazen killings “occurring daily in our country” as “innocent and unwary victims succumb to assassins’ bullets in broad daylight.” [Lim 2004]

“Judges…mostly handling drug related cases… had also been mercilessly killed or ambushed in line of duty… Media practitioners were similarly victims of the killings,” Lim added.

Lim asked SILG Reyes and PNP Chief Aglipay for help.In the same month, Reyes ordered a complete inventory of seized drugs after some were found missing [Journal]

“I had this suspicion that me nangyayaring kalokohan kasi marami ngang nahuhuli pero marami pa rin ang drugs sa kalye. And every time there is burning of drugs, I become suspicious because it is evidence that is being burned,” Reyes said.

It appears the DILG was already on its feet. However, a few months after the Lim speech, Narcopolitics reared, yet again, its ugly head.
In January 2005, PO2 Jonathan Moreño went amok. Moreño went on a shooting rampage during the “Ati-atihan” festival in Kalibo, Aklan. Moreño killed six people: five policemen and a young girl. Mental issues became the focal point of the ensuring investigation, but “crazy” is just a symptom. Moreños colleagues was under intense pressure because he was a primary witness in a case against a suspected drug lord [AJ].
What’s alarming, however, are the news stories the followed: there were none.

ThinkingPinoy searched for “DILG Angelo Reyes Drugs” pages dated 01 February 2005 (after the Aklan incident) up to 01 Mar 2006 (after Reyes’ DENR appointment), and it yielded zero relevant information [Google].

Reyes was appointed as DENR chief on 05 February 2006 [PWPA].

Ronaldo Puno, who also served as SILG in the Erap Era, retook the SILG post in 2006 after Reyes was assigned to the DENR. He served from 2006 up to the end of President Arroyo’s term in June 2010

As to what exactly happened from February 2005 to 2010, your guess is as good as mine. What’s clear, however, is that in those years, PH Narcopolitics was on the rise.

In 2009, for example, it was reported that PDEA received bribes in exchange for dropping charges against three high-profile drug suspects known as the ”Alabang Boys” [Inq].

PDEA reports to the Dangerous Drugs Board [PDEA], of which the DILG chief is a member [DDB]. The Chief of Police, who reports to NAPOLCOM, is also a DDB member, so that DILG chief de facto controls two seats in DDB.

Another Puno

Now, recall that Sec. Ronaldo Puno was PGMA’s DILG chief from 2006 until PGMA stepped down in 2010.






Aquino won the 2010 presidential elections, and he made Naga City Mayor Jesse Robredo DILG Secretary in July 2010 [News5]. Logically, Robredo would have become the NAPOLCOM chief and thus, have control over the Philippine National Police.

But this wasn’t the case. Aquino yielded PNP control to another Puno: Usec. RICO PUNO.

Aquino made Sec. Robredo focus on "the things that affect the local governments primarily," while he “designated (USec Rico) to be more directly in charge (of the police)." [GMA]

Rico Puno, a gun enthusiast, is Aquino’s kabarilan and longtime friend [GMA].
SIDE NOTE: You remember the 2010 Luneta Hostage Crisis where Hongkong tourists got killed by Malacañan’s incompetence? It was Rico Puno who called the shots [GMA]. Robredo, to his horror and dismay, was excluded by Aquino in the decision making, he reportedly Robredo wept as he watched the crisis unfold.
Incredibly, Aquino blamed PNP for the Quirino Grandstand debacle, but he spared Usec. Rico Puno from the blame [GMA], despite the latter being the de facto PNP commander during the crisis.
Let’s recap.

Narcopolitics used to be confined within LGUs. However, national officials admittedly depend on political machinery, i.e. support of LGUs. This means LGUs will support national officials who tolerate illegal drugs. National officials “tolerate drugs” by controlling (or disabling) the PNP.

Disabling the PNP requires control of NAPOLCOM, and Ronnie Puno has been controlling NAPOLCOM for much of the past decade from 2006 to 2010.

Rico Puno replaced Ronnie Puno in NAPOLCOM, but no reforms were implemented.

Rico Puno maintained the PNP's status quo: no names being named, no investigations, no research, exactly what the PDEA information officer said. Everybody in the drug community was happy.

That is, until neophyte Jesse Robredo got in the way.
(To clarify, all the succeeding "Puno"'s refer to Usec Rico Puno. Rico is distantly related to the older Ronaldo Puno [Davila], but its unclear if they maintain a close relationship. Tanginang oligarkiya yan, lahat na lang magkakamag-anak.)

The Thorn that’s Jesse Robredo

On 08 August 2012, Sec. Jesse Robredo issued memorandum that seeks to investigate a purportedly anomalous PNP assault rifle deal [ABS].
QUESTION: Who approves procurement deals for PNP?
ANSWER: NAPOLCOM, of which Usec. Rico Puno is head.
If Robredo’s investigation on the contentious PNP rifle deal shows corruption on NAPOLCOM’s part, Puno’s head will be on the chopping block. Unlike the Puno’s bungled 2010 Luneta Hostage Crisis, this assault rifle issue goes totally contrary to the Aquino Administration’s well-oiled “Daang Matuwid” campaign.

In short, if Robredo finds Puno guilty, PNoy will not be able to save him, as it would totally destroy the LP-led Administration’s public image and by extension, its heir-apparent Mar Roxas’ presidential ambitions.

Truth be told, Rico Puno, who belongs to Malacañan’s Samar Faction [Inq], won’t really care about Roxas’ ambitions because Roxas belongs to the rival “Balay” faction [TP: Roxas Rise].

Nevertheless, Puno’s control over the PNP is dependent on his ability to stay within PNoy’s favor, and thoroughly annoying rival Roxas and his Balay Faction won’t help.

In short, Puno needs to stop Robredo’s investigation.

Yes, the anomalous PNP gun deal is not directly related to narcotics. However, for the first time in ages, here's a DILG chief who's bent on cleaning up the department. After investigating this PNP gun deal, what else could Robredo possibly investigate?

Narcopolitics, perhaps?

All the more reason to stop Robredo.

Suddenly and conveniently, Robredo died in a plane crash on 18 August 2012 [ABS], 10 days after Robredo issued the controversial memo.

A day later, ABS-CBN’s Anthony Taberna reported that Puno, along with PNP Sr. Supt. Joel Pagdilao, tried to raid Robredo’s condominium unit. They also tried to enter Robredo’s offices at the DILG and at the National Police Commission.

They did this to “secure the classified documents kept by Robredo” [ABS].
QUESTION: Who was Robredo investigating on?
ANSWER: Rico Puno and Joel Pagdilao, among others.
As expected, PNoy defended Puno by saying, "Sometime in the early evening, tumawag sa atin si Secretary Leila de Lima at pinaalalang may mga confidential folders si Secretary Robredo that needed to be secured. [ABS]"

PNoy was referring to the raid in Robredo’s DILG and NAPOLCOM offices. However, asked if he also ordered Puno to seal Robredo's condominium housing unit in Quezon City, the President said no [ABS].

Oh! And Puno approved the controversial gun deal two weeks after Robredo’s death [ABS].

Tibay rin ng mukha, no?

Robredo’s death resulted into Mar Roxas’ appointment as DILG chief, per a 31 August 2012 palace announcement [GMA]. This is good news for Roxas, as the DILG portfolio allows him to reach grassroots, providing him a golden opportunity to secure LGU support for his 2016 presidential run.

Mar wants LGU support, right? And a lot of LGUs are narcopoliticians, right? Connect the dots.

Mar belongs to Balay Faction, Puno belongs to Samar Faction, i.e. They hate each other. Adding mounting pressure from the public amid the controversial gun deal, Puno quit from his DILG post on 11 September 2012 Rappler].

And that policeman Pagdilao? He's one of the five generals that Duterte named last week.

Duterte names 5 generals allegedly involved in drug trade:
Duterte names 5 generals allegedly involved in drug trade:

The 5 are retired director general Marcelo Garbo Jr, former National Capital Region Police Office chief Joel Pagdilao, former Quezon City Police District Office chief Edgardo Tinio, former Region 11 police chief Bernardo Diaz, and Vic Loot, who is now mayor of Daanbantayan, Cebu.

Video Courtesy of CNN Philippines.
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Tuesday, July 5, 2016

Puno out, Roxas in, Pagdilao stays

With Puno out of the picture, Roxas took NAPOLCOM’s reins and consequently controlled the PNP, the same PNP that allowed the rise of Philippine Drug Syndicates, the rise of Philippine Narcopolitics.

Did Roxas attempt to disentangle PNP from the drug cartel? If Roxas' association with Pagdilao serves as an indicator, the answer is “No”.
Shortly before the launch of Oplan Lambat-Sibat in 2014, Roxas fired and replaced all NCR district police chiefs except for EPD chief Villacorta [TP: Lambat-Sibat]. This includes the sacking and replacement of QCPD’s chief of police. 
Roxas replaced the QCPD chief with Joel Pagdilao, the same PNP general who was in cahoots with Puno [Star]. That is, despite a new “panginoon”, it appeared that the PNP is “business as usual”. 
Before Roxas’ resigned from the DILG in August 2015 [Inq], he still managed to promote Pagdilao as NCRPO police chief.
During his short DILG stint, Roxas promoted Pagdilao TWICE. This is the same Pagdilao who raided Jesses Robredo’s offices a day after he died.

Psst, VP Leni, tinatarantado ka na ng mga kapartido mo, hindi ka man lang umaalma?

Given Pagdilao and Puno’s “working relationship”, the deep rapport between Pagdilao and Roxas initially came to ThinkingPinoy as a surprise. That is, until TP discovered that in 1996, Roxas, still a neophyte congressman, was invited by PMA Class 1984 to be an honorary member [Inq]

Pagdilao also belongs to the PMA Class of 1984 [Inq].

Roxas-Era Narcopolitics

Did the 2012 change in DILG leadership help abate the rise of PH Narcopolitics?

Apparently not, given the proportion of barangays with drug problems.

For one, it’s clear that Roxas did not exert effort in researching the extent of PH Narcopolitics. Second, Roxas is in cahoots with pretty much the same PNP hierarchy that was under ex-DILG Usec. Rico Puno, which is the same PNP hierarchy under DILG Sec. Ronnie Puno.

And before Duterte's announcement on 06 July 2016, not a single high-ranking PNP official has faced drug-related charges.

ThinkingPinoy did a search for “+Narcopolitics Philippines” [Google], limited to articles published between 01 January 2013 and 31 December 2014 and it yielded only one relevant result: that the notorious Mexican Sinaloa Drug Cartel has reached our shores [Inq].
BRIEF: The Sinaloa drug cartel is considered the largest and most powerful drug trafficking organization in the West. It has been the major player in the drug war in Mexico that has claimed the lives of 77,000 Mexicans since 2006.
This is alarming, but this cannot be the first major drug cartel that entered the local drug market.

Why didn’t the PNP mention anything new about anyone else during that period?

There are two possible explanations:
  1. All the other drug traffickers are small-time pushers.
  2. PNP is turning a blind eye, or worse, is part of the drug problem.
The sheer magnitude of the drug menace makes [1] extremely unlikely, so we are left with [2].

Under Roxas' stewardship of the PNP, the Philippine Drug Situation just got worse.

24 Oras: Mga signal booster at shabu lab sa Bilibid, nabisto n...
Hindi lang pala nagluluto ng shabu, nagsetup na rin pala ng telecommunications network ang mga inmate sa Bilibid. Tapos, gusto pang gawin ngayong Senate Justice Committee Chair si Leila de Lima? Grabe, ibang level.
Courtesy: 24 Oras, GMA Network
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Sunday, June 26, 2016

Drug lords reportedly rule the New Bilibid Prison [Inq], with several people, including a drug lord, claiming that shabu is cooked inside the Bilibid Prison itself [ABS].

Bilibid inmate, kayang takutin ang mga jail guards
Bilibid Guard: "Bakit mga tao ni JB (Sebastian), ayaw niyong hulihin?"
Colangco: "Mga put*** *** niyo, kaya ko kayong ipapatay!"

Si Colangco ay miyembro ng Chinese-linked drug triad na pinangalanan ni Pang. Duterte kamakailan. Maski guwardiya ng Bilibid, kaya nitong pagbantaan.

OFFTOPIC: Mahilig kumanta si Herbert Colangco, halos linggo-linggo ay nagco-concert ito siya sa Bilibid! Nagkaroon pa nga siya ng album at naging platinum pa! kaya ang kanyang selda sa loob, parang recording studio.

Courtesy of ABS-CBN News.
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Saturday, July 9, 2016
The embedded Facebook video above mentions a certain "JB Sebastian". This is the same high-profile drug lord JB Sebastian featured a 2013 Discovery Channel documentary that explains how Drug Lords have lorded over the New Bilibid Prison.

DISCOVERY CHANNEL: Gang Leaders run Bilibid, rubs elbows with ...
DISCOVERY CHANNEL: GANG LEADERS RUN BILIBID, RUB ELBOWS WITH PNOY, DE LIMA [PLS SHARE]

Host: Wait ‘till you see what he showed me in his office.
Gang Leader: “This is the current director of the Bureau of Corrections.”
Host: “Who’s this guy?”
Gang Leader: “He’s the president of the Philippines.” [Noynoy Aquino]

Host: You gotta be kidding me!
Gang Leader: This is the Secretary of Justice. [Leila de Lima]
Host: What blows my mind is this. You’re a convicted kidnapper, and a serial kidnapper… it wasn’t just once...
Gang Leader: …a hijacker and a carnapper as well…

Host: In America, if our attorney general sat down with a gang member, his job would be lost by the evening news.
Gang Leader: I think they need the leadership of the gangs.
Host: Otherwise, chaos?
Gang Leader: I think so.

Video Courtesy of Discovery Channel.
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Friday, February 26, 2016

What’s more alarming? A key Jesse Robredo confidante was murdered in 2014.
In August 2014, Retired Senior Police Officer 3 Dionisio “Dennis” Tan, 56, was shot and murdered in his Makati residence. Tan worked for Interior Secretary Jesse Robredo when he was still the mayor of Naga City and during Robredo’s term as Cabinet secretary at the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) [Inq].
This happened during Roxas’ stewardship of the DILG. And in 2015, just a month after Roxas left DILG for the campaign, gunmen fired at Anthony Taberna's QC coffee shop. Yes, the same guy who wrote the exclusive on Puno and Pagdilao's raid of Robredo's offices [ABS].
CCTV: Ka Tunying's coffee shop riddled with gunfire
Narito ang CCTV footage ng pananambang sa coffee shop ni ABS-CBN reporter Anthony "Ka Tunying" Taberna ng di pa nakikilalang mga kalakihan noong 2015.

Si Taberna ang sumulat noont 2012 ng exclusive na balita tungkol sa pag-raid ni DILG Usec Puno at ni PNP Gen Pagdilao sa mga opisina ni Jesse Robredo isang araw matapos itong mamatay.

LEARN MORE: http://www.thinkingpinoy.net/2016/07/pnp-generals-and-ph-narcopolitics-jesse-robredo.html

Video courtesy of DZBB's Allan Gatus: http://twitter.com/allangatus/status/637053398592843776/video/1
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Tuesday, July 12, 2016

Roxas knows pushers

Roxas knows "where to buy them".
In February 2016, Roxas said, “There are drugs in Davao. If you want, I can bring you there. We can buy drugs in Davao. So it’s not true that he can do it [Star].”
“The same is true in Makati. There are drugs in Makati. We can buy shabu, we can buy cocaine, we can buy heroin. I know that! That’s the news that reached me,” Roxas said. 
“May droga sa Davao ngayon. Ngayon lang, gusto mo samahan kita e, makakabili tayo ng droga sa Davao e,” Roxas added [Inq].
President Duterte’s camp, which is closely identified with Davao City, issued a rebuttal.
“He did not only exhibit irresponsible citizenship by not reporting to authorities where drugs are being peddled, he has, in fact, become an accomplice in protecting drug lords and drug pushers,” Duterte spokesman Peter Tiu Laviña said in a statement [Inq].
Laviña asked, “What has he done as Secretary of DILG (Department of the Interior and Local Government) and as chairman of the National Police Commission to fight drug abuse?” Laviña asked.
In 2012, the PNP had a new face in Roxas, but it’s still filled with the same people who worked under Rico Puno. In 2010, the PNP had a new face in Rico Puno, but it's the same people who worked for Ronnie Puno.

Mar, Rico, and Ronnie had a common strategy against the Drug Cartel.

The strategy? Do nothing.
Over the past 10 years, there was only one opportunity to really fix the PNP.
That opportunity was named Jesse Robredo.
He ended up dead. 

[ThinkingPinoy] PLEASE DONT FORGET TO SHARE!

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#LeilaDilemma: Ooh, Ronnie… you’re a very… very... bad boy.

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Karma is a b*tch, and it bit de Lima right in the *ss.


Let’s recap what has happened so far. 

On Wednesday 17 August, President Rodrigo Duterte accused de Lima of having an illicit affair with her married driver, who allegedly was the drug money bagman [ABS] in the New Bilibid Prison. Several hours later, De Lima responded by saying Duterte was unprofessional, that his tirade was foul, and that she refuses to dignify that allegation [ABS]. 

On Thursday 18 August, De Lima claimed that the allegations were just meant to derail her investigations on alleged Palace-sanctioned extrajudicial killings [CNN]. 

On Friday 19 August, De Lima denied drug links, but admitted that there were “snippets of truth” in Duterte’s allegations. De Lima refused to identify these “snippets” [GMA].
Before we go any further, let’s make sure that everything is clear.

First, what are Duterte’s allegations [CNN]?
  1. Driver Ronnie Dayan is or was a drug money bagman.
  2. De Lima had an affair with Dayan while Dayan was a drug money bagman.
Second, how did de Lima respond?

De Lima denied drug links but admitted “snippets of truth”. She didn’t elaborate but it’s clear that as of 19 August:
  1. De Lima did not deny Dayan allegedly being a drug money bagman.
  2. De Lima did not deny the alleged affair. 

Was the exposé necessary?


If Duterte exposed the Leila-Ronnie affair with the sole purpose of publicly humiliating de Lima, then Duterte deserves a good spanking.

But that isn’t the case.The first allegation alone would have allowed de Lima to invoke plausible deniability. That is, De Lima could have simply denied knowledge of any of Dayan’s damnable actions. Like Mar Roxas vis-à-vis the Mamasapano incident [Star], De Lima could just say “I didn’t know he did it,” or, “I had no control over it.”

Thus, the second allegation – the illicit affair – was necessary to help establish de Lima’s complicity with Dayan’s actions.
  • How can a mere driver afford a palatial home in Pangasinan? Because he sleeps with de Lima.
  • How can a mere driver exercise so much power over drug lords? Because he sleeps with de Lima.
  • How can a mere driver evade law enforcement for so long? Because he sleeps with de Lima.
But did Duterte reveal the affair, or was it publicly known beforehand?

The affair was so 2014

Duterte alleges that De Lima’s illicit relationship empowered driver Dayan to commit crimes with de facto impunity. Duterte, however, was not the one who opened De Lima’s can of worms, as the affair has been known since 2014.
In June 2014, whistleblower Sandra Cam opposed de Lima’s confirmation as Justice Secretary, citing “De Lima’s personal life is likewise replete with controversies which overthrow her integrity as a public servant.” Testifying before the Senate Commission on Appointments, Cam accused de Lima of having illicit affairs with certain men, including “a driver” [Inq] who was later identified as Ronnie Dayan.

While controversial, “office romances” do not necessarily translate into abuse of power so we ask:
Did the illicit affair enable the driver to wield incommensurate power and influence and abuse it thereafter?

2014: Ronnie goes Rambo

Just how powerful did Ronnie Dayan become by virtue of his copulatory links with de Lima?

A 2014 Urbiztondo Pangasinan Incident gives us a clue.

On 12 August 2014, de Lima personal driver-bodyguard Ronnie Dayan figured in an incident in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan [Bombo]:
  • Village watchman Budoy Palisoc said he was in a drinking session with Dayan and three other de Lima bodyguards. Dayan got too drunk and suddenly fired his gun.
  • Palisoc fled the area, only for Dayan and the three other bodyguards to chase him with gunfire. Palisoc managed to escape. 
  • Dayan also beat up the villagers who tried to break the fight.
  • Unable to find Palisoc, the frustrated Dayan redirected his wrath onto Palisoc’s 74-year-old mother Perlita, held her by the collar, and threated to kill her if she will not reveal Palisoc’s whereabouts.
  • Dayan said he can buy off Palisoc’s family if he wanted to.
  • Urbiztondo chief of police C/Insp. Wilfredo Cabayanan said the incident was reported two hours later so they were unable to arrest Dayan, as the latter has already fled to Manila.
On 13 August 2014, the Philippine Star reported on the same incident. The salient point of this report are as follows [Star]:
  • Ronnie Dayan allegedly fired his gun indiscriminately during an incident in Barangay Dalaguiring.
  • Investigators recovered caliber .45 bullet shells from the crime scene.
  • PNP said charges are set against Dayan.
This already sounds fishy at this point. Cabayanan said he wasn't able to arrest Dayan because he fled to Manila. De Lima said Dayan resigned in 2015 [MT], so Dayan was with De Lima the day after the incident. Why did Cabayanan fail to request NCR's PNP to arrest Dayan? Why did De Lima fail to turn Dayan in? Was the Justice Secretary so clueless about her driver's deeds?

Oh, because he f*cks her. That explains a lot.
On 15 August 2014, Urbiztondo PNP virtually said Dayan is clear [Star]:
  • PNP C/Insp. Cabayanan said the case against Ronnie Dayan lacks substance.
  • Cabayanan said PNP recovered bullet shells but it was not enough to establish probable cause, saying that there were no witnesses to support the complaint.
  • Cabayanan said they would verify the owner of the gun and its license, noting the permit to carry firearms outside residence in Pangasinan remains suspended.
  • Aside from Palisoc, Dayan reportedly punched police officer Ariel Hardinoza of the Alcala town police. Dayan and Hardinoza settled the matter amicably after a talk at the police station. Complainant Palisoc is Dayan’s relative.
ThinkingPinoy did a Google search on “Ronnie Dayan” news articles from 16 August 2014 up to 16 August 2016.

There were none.

Ronnie Dayan almost killed his own relatives and yet…
  • Not even a warrant of arrest? 
  • Not even a search warrant? 
  • Not even a statement from the PNP saying the bullets weren’t Dayan’s? 
  • Not even a statement from de Lima promising a fair investigation?
Is it because Dayan makes de Lima “exquisitely satisfied”?

Oooh… Ronnie… you’re a very… very… bad… boy.

De Lima admits affair

Let’s zoom back to August 2016.

On 21 August 2016, De Lima tacitly admitted her illicit affair with Dayan, the Manila Times reported [MT]. De Lima said, “We got close, but just how close I will no longer touch on that because it’s too personal.”

“If you (Duterte) persist in your accusations that I profited from drugs because I am a coddler or protector (of drug dealers), or that I received drug money in the form of campaign funds or whatever, you will be embarrassed and I don’t want that to happen to you,” de Lima added.

At last, a denial! However, it was issued four days later on the third attempt. Does she truly have no drug links, or was this statement an afterthought?

From the same Manila Times report, De Lima said, “There are some who are going around Bilibid [to]access certain convicts to point [to]me as coddler of illegal drug syndicates. But there are no takers,” she said.

Too many words. Just deny the two allegations for crying out loud!

On 22 August 2016, Duterte said Ronnie Dayan lorded over Bilibid, allowing “partying, drugs, and cooking shabu (in Bilibid) went well, unbridled, unhampered.”
Duterte said, “Would you think that a driver of a Department of Justice employee could have allowed these things all by himself?”

“These illegal things which you saw on TV… Would you think that without de Lima giving him the authority to allow the inmates to do that? All of these could have only happened if there was a go-signal from the head of the department, which is the secretary (De Lima),” Duterte said [Video].

The next several days will be more and more interesting.

I will need to stock on microwaveable popcorn.

File a case? Due process?

Several groups decried a “lack of due process” when Duterte publicly accused de Lima. The problem, however, is that De Lima herself tacitly approves of this name-and-shame method when Aquino was in power.

On 23 July 2013, De Lima said in 2013 that she saw nothing wrong with Aquino publicly naming and shaming government officials in the latter’s just-concluded State of the Nation Address.

“It’s just right that President Aquino publicized his anger and frustration at those agencies in the negative list,” De Lima said in Filipino [GMA].

De Lima said this in light of the concerned bureaus’ callousness, despite the criminal and administrative cases filed against the erring officials. Thus, some would argue, “But at least Aquino filed a case.”
So how about this this other one?

Karma is B!tch

In March 2009, de Lima launched an inquiry into the existence of the Davao Death Squad, with Duterte as her prime suspect [Preda; Mindanews].

By September 2009, de Lima still wasn’t able to find conclusive evidence proving the existence of the vigilante group Davao Death Squad (DDS), let alone Duterte’s complicity, and the probe eventually died a natural death [Inq].

In 2012, CHR chairperson Loretta Rosales said the commission wants the Ombusdman to investigate Duterte, based on the results of the previous probe that the commission conducted on the alleged presence and operations of the DDS [TV5], still no conclusive evidence.

Despite the lack of evidence, De Lima continued to hound Duterte with mass murder allegations up to this day.

As of May 2015, no DDS-related cases were ever filed against Duterte. An exasperated Duterte said, “If she (de Lima) files a case, I’ll waive the preliminary investigation, but she has to execute an affidavit because I’m going to question her,” he said [Inq].

Ask two days ago about why Duterte wasn’t charged, de Lima said, “We don’t have enough evidence against them. There [was] no one to execute a sworn affidavit to prove the existence of the death squad. [MT]”

So let me get this straight:
  1. De Lima has accused Duterte of leading the Davao Death Squad since 2009 at the latest.
  2. Up to this day, he still accuses Duterte of such.
  3. De Lima herself admits inconclusive evidence.
And now, De Lima wants Duterte to immediately produce evidence?

Wow. Just wow. Leila, you have waived your right to demand that because you did it before, i.e. you told the public it's okay to accuse someone for years with no evidence.

You're basically getting a taste of your own sh!t.

ThinkingPinoy’s Takeaways

On 19 August 2016, De Lima told Duterte [Star], “You are president. I am just a senator. A fair game is the only thing I ask.”

What de Lima conveniently forgot is the fact that from March 2009 to June 2016, she was the chair of a constitutional commission and the head of the Justice Department, while Duterte was just a city mayor (or even less) at the time.

Did Duterte complain about bullying? No, he fought tooth and nail to stay afloat, despite the odds being stacked against him.

Senator de Lima, you should not have done unto others what you don’t want others to do unto you. Because if they do the same thing to you, that’s karma.

Besides, you have never issued a categorical denial of the charges. You are a lawyer, you should know what I mean.

The tables have turned, Madamme Senator.Good luck and Godspeed.[ThinkingPinoy]

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Who is CHR Chair Chito Gascon? [Part 1 of 2]

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If you have been watching the Senate hearings on extrajudicial killings, you’ve probably noticed the presence of Jose Luis Martin “Chito” Gascon, chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). With that said, there was something he said in the hearings that raised my eyebrows.


When asked about how many cases of policemen killed on duty the CHR is investigating, Gascon’s answer was one (1) case. To be fair, Gascon argued that the CHR usually handles cases against the government.

Per EO 163 s. 1987, CHR is tasked to investigate violations involving civil and political rights (CPR), or rights that generally restrict the powers of the government in respect of actions affecting the individual freedoms and opportunities for participatory governance [LincolnU].

Second nature

But policemen have CPRs too. If Gascon is so convinced that the President sanctions summary killings, wouldn’t it mean that Duterte is trampling on the right to life of policemen that he would have been using as pawns?

With just 1 case out of 150 involving a dead cop, Gascon clearly doesn’t see it that way.
I am usually snarky to people that I do not like, but I give lots of consideration for groups whom I believe are reasonably predisposed to act a certain way. Gascon, being the CHR chair, is expected to be far more passionate in advocating for human rights than a pedestrian like me. Hence, his eagerness over this particular senate investigation is something that I did not take against him.

Chito Gascon is the CHR chair for crying out loud! To fight for human rights is supposed to be second nature to him.

But before we go further, let me give you a quick rundown of what we learned from the two witnesses.

The Two Witnesses

Sen. De Lima interrogated two women whose family members are alleged victims of extrajudicial killings.

1st Witness: Harra Kazuo (Bertes)

The first witness, who identified herself as the 26-year-old “Harra Kazuo”, was the wife of suspected drug dealer JP Bertes and daughter-in-law of Renato Bertes. Pasay City cops killed the two Berteses on 07 July 2016. Harra admitted the following JP sold shabu in 2015 and bribed cops once with P10,000 in exchange for their silence. JP was already trying to quit drug dealing when Pasay cops raided their home and arrested JP and Renato some time before 07 July 2016. Harra learned of their death on 07 July 2016, with Pasay P/Supt. Nolasco Bathan claiming that the two tried to grab the cops’ firearms as they were about to be detained [Star].

2nd Witness: Mary Rose Aquino

The second witness, 23-year-old Mary Rose Aquino, is the eldest daughter of suspected drug dealer couple Rodelio and Rosalie Campos. Aquino admitted that her parents used and sold drugs sourced from Antipolo cops who, in turn, sourced them from police operations. One day, her parents left home to remit P50,000 pesos to the corrupt Antipolo City policemen. They never came back. They were murdered [Star].

An Duterte EJK Policy?

Everyone, regardless of political affiliation, will agree that this Senate Hearing on Extrajudicial Killings is aimed pinning the hundreds of murders in the past couple of months on President Duterte. Despite my personal political inclinations, I still am a curious political observer, so I find this senate investigation extremely interesting.
The murders discussed in the hearing are abhorrent and detestable, but it’s time to put things back to perspective.

Let us remember that the anger over the extrajudicial killings arises from the notion that summary killing has become President Duterte’s policy. To prove this, at least one of the following conditions must hold:
  1. Duterte formally order summary killings, or
  2. Duterte tolerates abuses of law enforcement officers.

Now, let’s apply this concept to the two testimonies.

Linking to Duterte

Both witnesses alleged that corrupt cops are “cleaning up evidence” as they eliminate their minions to prevent the latter from exposing their modus operandi. That is, corrupt cops are executing their drug assets to avoid incrimination [Star].

Hence, given the two conditions, the relevant question would be:
Did Duterte formally order those killings, or did Duterte tolerate the cops’ abuses?

First, did Duterte formally order those killings?

The statement “Kill drug dealers and I’ll give you a medal,” allegedly said by Duterte, is often used to justify the claim that he turned EJKs into official state policy. This is not true, as the complete statement was:

“Feel free to call the police, or do it yourself if you have a gun… In an arrest, you must overcome the resistance of the criminal. And if he fights… (if) he fights to (the) death, you can kill him. Just follow that. Only if your life is in danger and the criminal is armed and hostile, shoot him, and I will give you a medal [TP: 400 deaths].”

In short, Duterte never ordered summary killings, and neither of the witnesses’ statements suggested the same.

Second, did Duterte tolerate the cops’ abuses?

The Pasay City cops have already been charged with murder [Star], while the Antipolo cops have been relieved [GMA]. Way before the hearing, Duterte has even named and shamed police generals for their alleged links with the drug trade [TP: PNP Generals].

Hence, it is clear that in as far as the two testimonies are concerned, the president didn’t tolerate EJKs.

In as far as the Senate Investigation is concerned, de Lima failed to show that the allegedly drug-related deaths are part of government policy.

The second day actually turned out to be free positive PR for PNP Chief Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, as he charmed everyone with his honesty and dedication to his work. Bato even managed to secure the senators’ unsolicited promises to increase funding for salaries, firearms, patrol cars, fuel, training facilities, lawyers’ fees [MB].

Gascon insists on ICC Case

Yes, that’s how persuasive Bato was on that day, and he was defending the police force as a whole the entire time. Unfortunately, despite the “prosecution’s” failure to link the murders to state-sanctioned extrajudicial killings, it appears that Chito Gascon remained unfazed.

At the end of the second day, Gascon said the International Criminal Court (ICC) may possibly assume jurisdiction over the extrajudicial and vigilante killings of suspected drug dealers if the Philippine government fails to address the issue [Star].

So ThinkingPinoy tried to look for ICC guidelines related to Gascon’s claim.

According to an ICC document, the ICC “can only exercise jurisdiction where national legal systems fail to do so, including where they purport to act but in reality are unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out proceedings [ICC]”.

Thus, I ask:

Wouldn’t it be premature for Gascon to say the the government “failed” to address the EJK issue when the fact of the matter is that the new administration is barely two months old?
Has Duterte government prevented the judiciary from exercising its powers?
Has the Duterte government ignored even a single case of police abuse?

Quite the contrary actually, so why does Gascon insist on the ICC angle despite the absence of prerequisites?

Simply put, why the fear-mongering?

Jose Luis Martin “Chito” Gascon

Gascon is well educated and he benefits from the advice of CHR’s fleet of lawyers so that ignorance of the law is unlikely. Hence, the logical question would be:
“Could his decisions be affected by serious conflicts of interest?”
To answer that, I researched Gascon’s past to have an idea of the man that he is right now.

Let’s start.

Jose Luis Martin “Chito” Gascon arrived onto the national stage in 1986. Then the chairman of the University of the Philippines Student Council, he was among the first to heed the call of Cardinal Sin’s call to join the First EDSA Revolution [PCIJ].

Gascon was the youngest member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution. Four years later, Congress named him as youth sector representative, giving him a direct hand in crafting the country’s laws [PCIJ].

For much of the 1990s and 2000s, I didn’t see anything controversial or blatantly questionable about him. He graduated from the University of the Philippines College of Law in 1996, and received a Master’s in International Law from Cambridge University in London a year later [LinkedIn].

Then I stumbled upon 2009.

(TO BE CONTINUED IN: Who is CHR Chair Chito Gascon? [Part 2 of 2] CLICK HERE)

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LP-led CHR wants a President Leni Robredo?

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This is the continuation of “Who is CHR Chair Chito Gascon? [Part 1 of 2]”.

LP Director and PNoy Usec Chito Gascon

Jose Luis Martin “Chito” Gascon became the Liberal Party’s (LP’s) Director-General in 2009. He openly supported then-Senator Noynoy Aquino’s bid for the presidency.

“I can’t give any indication on whether he would announce his presidential bid. I only have hopes and dreams that he would do so tomorrow,” Gascon said, after being asked whether the senator will finally announce his presidential candicacy [GMA].

Aquino eventually won the presidency in 2010, but not without controversy.

In May 2010, authorities were poised to investigate Quezon Governor and LP Treasurer Rafael Nantes for the discovery of drug transshipments and manufacturing base on Quezon’s Icolong Island [Balita], suggesting that drug money may be have been used to fund the 2010 LP campaign. Unfortunately for Nantes and luckily (?) for LP, Nantes died in a chopper crash a week after the announcement [TVPatrol].

The Nantes Issue happened during Gascon’s term as the Party’s Director-General. That is, Gascon was LP Director General from 2008-2011 and was the Political Director of its successful 2010 National Electoral Campaign [Liberal].

Yes, Gascon helped run the 2010 LP campaign with an alleged druggist as its treasurer.

Gascon stepped down from LP leadership in 2011 and was appointed Undersecretary within the Office of Political Affairs (OPA) by President Aquino (PNoy) [Star].

There isn’t much to be said about his performance in the OPA: he was one of the members of the Peace Panel [OPAPP] that attempted to forward the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL).

Of course, we all know that the Liberal Party-dominated Congress allowed that bill to die a natural death [Star], as the draft bill purportedly violated the constitution [ABS], the same bill that was drafted with Gascon’s help.

Gascon stepped down four years later to be appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights in June 2015 [Star].

Here is where things start to get really interesting. 

Mayor Duterte and de Lima’s CHR

In “Who is CHR Chair Chito Gascon? [Part 1 of 2]”, I explained that while de Lima reasonably succeeded to prove that extrajudicial killings exist, she failed to prove the crucial element of extrajudicial killings being systematically sanctioned by the national government.

Why is this element crucial? Because it is the reason behind this whole media circus to begin with.
Did any of the witnesses say Duterte himself ordered it? No. Did any of the testimonies or evidences show Duterte himself tolerated extrajudicial killings? No. But then, the failure to link these extrajudicial killings to Duterte is nothing new.

In early 2009, then CHR Chair Leila de Lima launched an inquiry into the existence of the Davao Death Squad, with Duterte as her prime suspect [Preda; Mindanews]. By September 2009, de Lima still wasn’t able to find conclusive evidence proving the existence of the vigilante group Davao Death Squad (DDS), let alone Duterte’s complicity, and the probe eventually died a natural death [Inq].

In 2012, CHR chairperson Loretta Rosales said the commission wants the Ombudsman to investigate Duterte, based on the results of the previous probe that the commission conducted on the alleged presence and operations of the DDS [TV5], still no conclusive evidence.

As of May 2015, no DDS-related cases were ever filed against Duterte. An exasperated Duterte said, “If she (de Lima) files a case, I’ll waive the preliminary investigation, but she has to execute an affidavit because I’m going to question her,” he said [Inq].
Asked recently about why Duterte was never charged, de Lima said, “We don’t have enough evidence against them. There [was] no one to execute a sworn affidavit to prove the existence of the death squad. [MT]”
Yes, six years of investigations and nonstop allegations and not a single case was filed for lack of probable cause.

Candidate Duterte and Gascon’s CHR


On 28 June 2015, LP said it hopes to Duterte will back Mar after Duterte shelved his own presidential bid [GMA], with Roxas “casually visiting” Duterte twice in a span of two weeks [Inq], and we all know how that ended up.

On 07 December 2015, Duterte declined all VP offers and declared his candidacy via a technicality [ABS].

On 11 December 2015, five days after Duterte filed his candidacy, the CHR announced that it will, for the third time, probe Duterte’s alleged rights abuses [GMA], with Gascon on the lead [CNN].

On 13 December 2015, Aquino and LP-led Malacañang publicly backed CHR’s probe [Star].

The timing of the CHR probe reeks of the stench of politicking.  But I admit that it's too early to say that at this point, so let's investigate a little bit more.
On 11 March 2016, rumors surfaced that the CHR was readying charges against Duterte for his alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings in Davao City [Star]. CHR did not press charges, essentially showing that the new round of investigations failed to yield significant results.

On 11 May 2016, the best CHR can say is they’ll be watching. Gascon said, “As all public officials will take oath to uphold the Constitution, we will hold that President-elect Duterte will stand for human rights [Inq].”

Seven fruitless years since the 2009 investigation and CHR found nothing significant enough to build a case against Duterte, yet the CHR and de Lima continue to hound Duterte with allegations.

Duterte never begged for mercy and he did not even block these investigation attempts, yet CHR still failed to indict Duterte. Why? CHR found no evidence linking him to these deaths. Because if there were, Roxas and de Lima would have been drooling like mad dogs.

It’s August 2016, three months have passed since then, and we are faced with yet another investigation.

Judging from Gascon’s insistence on the International Criminal Court angle [Star] despite the lack of evidence, the CHR has pretty much pre-judged Duterte.

Is CHR violating Duterte’s civil and political rights by doing so? But CHR’s mandate is protect citizens’ civil and political rights, right? 

Oh, the irony.

With these said, it is clear that the CHR, for seven years, has focused its resources on a crusade against Duterte, despite the chronic lack of evidence which, by the way, is the exact same thing that the CHR is required to produce. Should the CHR focus on allegations that actually have evidence to back them up? What’s confusing for me is CHR’s silence on another, more gruesome, extrajudicial killing case that, unlike the Duterte issue, provides a wealth of evidence.

I am referring to the worst post-Martial Law government-sanctioned human rights violation: The Hacienda Luisita Massacre

The 2004 Hacienda Luisita Massacre 

I am notorious for writing extremely long articles. Hence, to reduce the word count, here's a video clip taken during the 2004 Hacienda Luisita Massacre [TP: Hacienda Luisita]:




Police and army units killed at least seven protesting farmers [MS] and injured hundreds [Int’list]. More deaths followed in the succeeding years [GMA].

A decade later in 2014 and before Gascon became CHR head, CHR Commissioner Atty. Norberto dela Cruz and Region III Director Atty. Jasmin Navarro Regino confirmed various reports of grave rights violations in Hacienda Luisita during its field investigation held on April 29, 2014 [LuisitaWatch].

Despite these findings, nobody has been arrested as of April 2016 [DavaoToday].

I googled for news articles between 01 June 2015 to 26 August 2016 using the keyword “Gascon Luisita” [Google]. Google returned eight news articles, and none of them directly concerning Hacienda Luisita.

Over a year into Gascon’s CHR chairmanship, Gascon has not done anything to resolve the human rights violations in Hacienda Luisita. I was not even looking for cases filed against the Hacienda’s owners: even a reminder of an ongoing investigation will do. But no, there weren’t any.

No pronouncements from Gascon, despite the CHR’s 2014 confirmation that grave rights violations were committed.

Machinations and Hacienda Luisita

The massacre is just a small part of the decades-long struggle of Luisita farmers for their rights over Luisita land per the Comprehensive Land Reform Program in 1988 [L.A.Indymedia].

Using legal sorcery, the Cojuangcos held on to the land up to this day.

Now, let’s recall that anger over the extrajudicial killings arises from the notion that summary killing has become the President’s policy. To prove this, at least one of the following conditions must hold [TP: Gascon P1]:
  1. Duterte formally ordered summary killings, or
  2. Duterte tolerates abuses of law enforcement officers.
Now, sauce for the gander is sauce for the goose, so let's apply the same standards on PNoy vis-a-vis the Hacienda Luisita issue.

On the Hacienda Luisita issue, the second condition holds.

PNoy stance on the Luisita issue was clear as he and his ally, losing 2016 LP presidential bet Mar Roxas, defended the injustices against the Luisita farmers.
A few days before the 2010 Presidential elections, ABS-CBN published a list of alibis from PNoy, Roxas, and Hacienda Luisita spokesmen, suggesting that the Cojuangco Family’s wealth depends on the Noynoy presidency [ABS].

One of PNoy’s alibis reads, “Kami na nga po ang naaapi d’yan (We are already the ones being oppressed there).”

Despite PNoy’s stance, the Supreme Court sided with the farmers.

SC rules on Hacienda Luisita

On 25 April 2012, the Supreme Court unanimously decided to ordered the distribution of almost 5,000 hectares land to farmers and fixing the valuation for just compensation to the 1989 value of the land, making the land more affordable for the poor farmers [Inq]. Cabreza even wrote,
“Ecstatic cheers from weeping farmers shattered the silence on the court premises, after the tribunal allowed Hacienda Luisita farmers to keep their lands at a very low cost [Inq].”

While the decision was unanimous, one Supreme Court justice agreed with Hacienda Luisita Incorporated’s appeal that the 2006 valuation be used instead. That justice’s opinion, of course, was not adopted [Inq].

Who was that justice who sided with Cojuangcos? Maria Lourdes Sereno [Inq].

A month later, Chief Justice Renato Corona was impeached [Inq], with PNoy’s Malacañang allegedly bribing senators P50 million each to vote against him [GMA].

Who replaced Corona? Maria Lourdes Sereno [ABS].

The Supreme Court’s decision was final and executory, and it was up to Aquino’s Department of Agrarian Reform to implement the court order.

Through corporate-legal mumbo-jumbo, reclaimed ownership of the 6,453-hectare Hacienda Luisita, reducing the farmer-beneficiaries who were supposed to own the land under the agrarian reform program to sakadas or plantation workers [MS], instead of making them bonafide landowners under the Agrarian Reform Program.

As of yesterday, or almost 30 years after CARP’s launch and four years after the 2012 SC decision, the farmers still do not own the lands they till [Inq].

Question: Did Chito Gascon’s CHR do anything about it?

Answer: Nope. Nope. Nope. 

Rodrigo versus Luisita

On the Luisita Issue, the Aquino Administration clearly tolerated Hacienda Luisita Incorporated’s excesses to the detriment of poor Tarlaceño farmers. A countless number of articles, investigations, testimonials, admissions and other pieces of evidence say so.

Despite the preponderance of evidence, however, Gascon’s CHR deems the Luisita issue a non-priority.

On the Duterte Issue, the sequence of events in the previous sections clearly show the lack of evidence to pin down Duterte. An investigation in 2009, another in 2012, another in 2015, and another in 2016, all failed to produce sufficient evidence.

Despite this, Gascon’s CHR has been going after Duterte for seven years and running.

Thus, I ask, why?

Being its former director general and campaign director, Gascon has extremely close ties with the Liberal Party, and the Liberal Party’s head was PNoy, who also happens to be the poster boy of the Cojuangco Family, the “owners” of Hacienda Luisita.

Meanwhile, Duterte has become the Liberal Party’s archnemesis since he declared his candidacy. Duterte’s trademark in the past couple of months is his war on drugs. Unfortunately for LP, this will hurt, as many of its members and its appointees have been implicated in the drug trade [TP: Ronnie; TP: Robredo; TP: Mayors].

Interestingly, the Duterte Administration made peasant rights activist Rafael Mariano DAR Secretary. His first order as DAR Sec? Distribution of Hacienda Luisita land [Star/Yahoo].

Now, what would happen if Gascon somehow succeeds to remove Duterte from Malacañang?

The answer is simple:

A President Leni Robredo from the Liberal Party. [ThinkingPinoy]


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Death and the PH Drug Industry: from China to the Streets

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This is the story of how Filipinos get “shabulized”, from start to finish.


The debate over Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs has been raging for at least two months now, with proponents of each side saying their approach is better than the other. The problem, however, is that no one has, so far, provided anyone a clear an comprehensive explanation about how the illegal shabu (meth) industry works.

Thus, in this article, ThinkingPinoy will explain the Shabu Business Process from supply, to manufacture, to distribution, to retail, and finally, to consumption, with the Philippine Shabu Market in mind.

The shabu business is just like any other manufacturing business that follows this basic process:

Almost everybody knows this. However, what many still don’t understand is HOW EXACTLY this process works in the context of Philippine shabu, and explaining this process is what I will do.

Let’s go.

Step 1: Supply

There are many ways to cook shabu, with the basic method using several nondescript ingredients, ethyl phenyl acetate, whose legality in the Philippines is still unclear to me, and one key precursor chemical: ephedrine.
Ephedrine is a controlled substance in the Philippines [PDEA]. One kilogram of ephedrine, after combining with other ingredients, can be converted into 750 grams of shabu [Inq].

Large-scale shabu cooking operations are usually the domain of drug cartels. When I wrote “Duterte’s Drug War, where is the logic in 400 Deaths?”, I said there are at least 11 key players in the Philippine Shabu Industry:
  • The Sinaloa Drug Cartel, hailing from Mexico [MT]
  • Nine Chinese Drug Cartels, hailing from Mainland China [Star]
  • The African Drug Cartel, hailing from the Western African Continent [MT]

In 2014, it was discovered that the Hong Kong-based 14K and Sun Yee On triads (Chinese Cartel) supply raw materials for use in the Sinaloa cartel’s shabu laboratories in the Philippines [SCMP].

Hong Kong is part of China, and China is the No. 1 source of drugs in the Philippines [Inq]. Chinese cartels find it easy to smuggle shabu precursors into the country because the Philippines’ archipelagic nature provides lots of points of entry, and law enforcement was lax.

The government has identified three key persons who facilitate this process:
  • Wu Tuan, aka Peter Co
  • Peter Lim, aka Jaguar, protected by Ret. PNP Gen. Marcelo Garbo
  • Herbert Colangco, bilibid inmate and PMPC Star Awardee (LOL)
Bilibid Prison has own Music Studio
LOL: Herbert Colangco, the convicted kidnapping gang leader who owns the fully-equipped music studio at the New Bilibid Prison, won the “New Male Recording Artist” award at the 2014 PMPC Star Awards for Music for his platinum-selling debut album titled “Herbert C: Kinabukasan”. Colangco shared the award with actor Richard Yap.

(Huwag lang i-like, i-share mo na rin!)

#DaangMatuwid #RoxasRobredo2016 #Duterte2016 #MIriam2016 #binay2016 #LabanPoe2016
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Saturday, February 27, 2016
Yes, Colangco won the award WHILE IN PRISON.

Step 2: Manufacture

As long as you have ephedrine, manufacturing shabu is very easy: it does not require advanced training and all you need are household items that you can legally purchase from a supermarket, with the only major challenge being the ingredients’ flammability: a poorly-constructed, do-it-yourself shabu lab can explode [Inq].
Because cooking shabu is not very high-tech, setting up shabu labs is relatively easy. Hence, shabu labs have been found in many places in the Philippines, including:
  • Boats, e.g. the “floating shabu lab” found in Subic Bay [ABS]
  • Dug-up tunnels, e.g. the ones underneath the New Bilibid Prison [ABS. MT]
  • Abandoned houses, e.g. in Quezon City [Inq] or a posh village in Alabang [Inq]
Let’s recap:
  1. Chinese Cartels smuggle ingredients into the Philippines.
  2. Various local shabu labs, including those owned by the Mexican Sinaloa cartel, cook shabu.
Alright, the shabu is ready, what comes next?

Step 3: Distribution

The shabu final product is ready, so how does it reach the streets? This is where the second step comes in: shabu’s movement from the shabu labs to the hands of retailers.

Manufacturer-to-dealer logistics is pretty straightforward. What’s complicated however, are two things:
  1. Communication, i.e. coordination of their activities
  2. Law Enforcement

Just like regular citizens, drug syndicates communicate through mobile phones and the internet. This is the same reason why the government was in shock when it raided the New Bilibid Prison a few years ago and discovered cellular signal boosters inside the jail compound [GMA].It would have been easy for law enforcement agents to track the movements of these syndicates by tapping on their phone phone calls, but they are fraught with three key problems:

FIRST, wiretapped conversations are inadmissible as evidence in court per local laws [PCIJ]. This is the same reason why the Duterte cannot use as evidence the wiretapped conversation between Senator de Lima and her alleged driver-bodyguard-lover-bagman Ronnie Dayan, that was provided to him by foreign intelligence agents [GMA].

SECOND, SIM card registration is not required in the country [Inq], so drug dealers can simply toss an old SIM card, get a new one, and law enforcement agents who tap for leads will have to start all over.

THIRD, law enforcement agents themselves are involved in the drug trade [TP: PNP Generals; TP: Ooh… Ronnie; TP: 400 Deaths]. LGU officials are also involved in it, making manufacturer-to-dealer logistics a lot, lot easier [TP: Mayors].

Alright, so the shabu is now in the local wholesale drug dealer’s hands, so what happens next?

Step 4: Retail

Wholesale drug dealers then hand over shabu to smaller scale drug pushers (retailer, “tulak”), similar to the relationship between a large insurance company and a lowly insurance agent.

But there’s a major difference.

According to the US Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) [BJS 1992]:

A reputation for violence is the dealer’s best guarantee that his business transactions will be accomplished as agreed upon… Those who do not pay what they owe can expect to be disciplined violently or killed… Dealers often fail to pay because they were cheated or robbed or the drugs and/or money was confiscated by law enforcement.

When drug lords give a drug pusher shabu to sell on the streets, they expect that shabu to be sold entirely. Drug lords expect to be paid after a certain period and they do not accept returns. Drug lords kill street pushers who fail to meet their sales quota to strike fear on other street pushers. The fear motivates the surviving pushers.

You sell, or you die [ViceNews].

The fight against drugs is one of Duterte’s core campaign platforms, and his well-publicized crackdown on shabu caused demand to go down.

For example, in June 2016, demand for narcotics dropped in Naga City in anticipation of the Duterte’s 30 June 2016 inauguration [ABS].

A similar incident was report in the Cordilleras a month later, where Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA Regional Director Juvenal Azurin said in Filipino:
“There may be fewer people who want to buy (shabu), or the dealers want the trade to be faster to avoid being caught and for some other reasons. [Star]”

Again, what happens if a lowly drug pusher fails to meet his sales quota? He dies.

Step 5: Consumption

After a certain point, many shabu consumers or adiks (addicts) run out of personal funds to sustain their habit. This is when they resort to two things:
  1. Stealing, which we are all-too-familiar with, or worse,
  2. Becoming a drug pusher themselves.

Again, what happens when an addict-turned-pusher fails to meet his sales quota? He dies.

At this point, you now have a working idea about how large-scale shabu business works, but there’s one more thing that we haven’t discussed yet: Expansion and Stabilization.

Step 6: Expansion-Stabilization 

Shabu is a business. And just like any other business, they seek to expand operations as soon as they have established their core operations (i.e. Steps 1 to 5).

So how do drug syndicates do this?

FIRST, by expanding overseas.

Sinaloa is the most powerful and influential drug syndicate in Mexico today.

Established in the mid-1990s, the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel first gained control of the Mexican state of Sinaloa, then expanded to five other Mexican States. Afterwards, it established operations across the United States. After dominating North America, it set up operations in South America, West Africa, and Europe [Chalk 2012].

After North America, South America, Africa, and Europe, where else would it go? Asia.

But where in Asia?
  • Alcohol in the Middle East (West Asia) is largely banned [Matthee 2014], so just imagine the penalties for shabu. 
  • North Asia is sparsely populated and the logistics is messy because of the lack of viable sea routes.
  • East Asia (Japan, China, and South Korea) have well-developed and draconian policies.
  •  South Asia has weaker governments, but the general population is too poor to afford shabu.

What's left? Southeast Asia, where law enforcement is lax and the economies are booming.

Drug smuggling in Southeast Asia has been on the rise in as early as 2012 [Globe].

In 2013, authorities confirmed that the dreaded Mexican Sinaloa Drug Cartel has arrived in the Philippines [ABS]. Just last year, PDEA operatives arrested Horacio Hernandez in Makati City. Hernandez is third in command to the Sinaloa Drug Cartel [Vice].

SECOND, by taking over “territories”.
When a drug syndicate enters a geographic area, its operations may encounter resistance from other drug syndicates who are already operating in the same territory. Overlapping operations of rival drug syndicates bring rise to “turf wars”, where rival syndicates kill each other off to gain new territory or to protect their own.
Drug lords kill each other to gain territory
Reporter: "And you're ready to kill to protect your business?"

Pusher: "Yes, that has been happening."

ORIGINAL SOURCE: Vice News - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJ0I7HyZNiI
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Saturday, August 27, 2016
Let’s see how the the Sinaloa Cartel works [DailyMail].

In 2015, Israel Hinosa revealed he killed members of rival drug cartels under orders from the top honchos of the Sinaloa Drug Cartel, for as little as $30 (Php 1,500) per assignment. He was addicted to heroin and crystal meth, and he would indulge in these drugs to numb post-assassination psychological trauma.

Hinosa was a “sicario”, a desperate individual who became ruthless killers for the narcotrafficking industry and in his case, for the Sinaloa Cartel. Sicarios were an integral part of the mass murders ensuing from the Sinaloa Cartel’s declaration war on the Juarez Cartel in 2007, where more than 20,000 people in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico lost their lives in the next five years.

Hence, we ask: Do we have sicarios in the Philippines?

Yes, we do [MB].

Let’s watch the video clip shown below:
Drug Pushers and Turf Wars
Drug Pusher: If they want to take over our territory, we can't just allow them to get it as easy as that.

Original Source: Vice News; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJ0I7HyZNiI
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Saturday, August 27, 2016

THIRD, they connive with law enforcement.
We all know this.



If you want to know more, you can read the following articles I previously wrote:


And what happens when a lowly drug dealer wants to surrender or possibly become a state witness against a powerful government official? He dies.

Duterte's War on Drugs

Duterte previously asserted that most of the shabu in the Philippines come from Chinese Cartels whose base is, obviously, in China [SCMP]. Because he has zero authority over the China, he has to cooperate with the Chinese government in this regard. As to how the Chinese government will deal with is, is a totally different story.

This is the same reason why Duterte said, ““Hey, I have to invade a country to arrest the drug lords [Inq]”.

Given these, what can Duterte do?

Looking at Steps 1 to 5, we can see that while Step 1 might be out of the government’s hands, the remaining steps are done within the country, i.e. within the government’s jurisdiction.

This is the same “drug apparatus” that Duterte has been referring to [MB].

That is, even if the government exercises no power over the supply of raw materials, it still has power to destroy manufacturing plants, distribution facilities, retail networks and most importantly, the corrupt public officials who make all of them possible.

However, the disruption of shabu’s business process means death. As I have explained in the previous sections:
  • If a drug dealers fails to meets his quota, someone dies.
  • If a drug dealer wants to gain new territory, someone dies.
  • If he wants to protect his own territory, someone dies.
  • If he wants to turn himself in or become a state witness, someone dies.
No amount of government regulation will prevent drug dealers from killing other, precisely because they operate outside government control. And what's the only way to prevent them from killing each other? By stopping the drug war, but that also means we will be letting them kill the rest of the population instead.

Legalization of shabu? Of course not. The oft-cited Portuguese drug decriminalization is about cocaine and heroin, which work VERY DIFFERENTLY from shabu.

No, shabu decriminalization will not work either.

Besides, if decriminalization was even feasible, is that the executive's problem? It's the legislature who should be doing that. It is DE LIMA who should be doing that.

ThinkingPinoy's Takeaways


Duterte’s war on drugs has been encountering opposition from local and international media, with the latter blaming the alleged drug-related deaths – even all of the vigilante killings – solely on the administration. The problem, however, is that mainstream media’s reasoning is too simplistic, as it totally ignore the gruesome reality that I have just explained.

The recently concluded Senate Hearing on Extrajudicial Killings is a testament to that. We saw two days’ worth of grandstanding on the part of Senator Leila de Lima and CHR Chairman Chito Gascon, but not a single testimony or piece of evidence showing that the State itself sanctioned extrajudicial killings or even tolerated it [TP: Gascon; TP: Leni Robredo].

Mainstream media wants the killings to stop, but they provide no viable alternatives.

I guess mainstream media's oligarch owners simply cannot bear the idea that a common man with a heart for the people is now the most powerful Filipino... or are our mainstream journalists on the payroll of drug lords themselves? [ThinkingPinoy]

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Mainstream vs Indie: Who’s winning the PH social media wars?

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A few days ago, I posted a Facebook status update that compares Mocha Uson Blog page stats with those of the four major media outfits in the country. I was able to get the stats using Facebook Page Insights, an analytics tool that’s freely accessible by anyone who owns a Facebook page.

To cut the long story short, I basically discovered that Mocha Uson is actually giving the four major networks (ABS-CBN, GMA, Inquirer, and Rappler) a run for their money in the social media game.

And so, I thought, why limit it to just five? Why not learn more about the social media wars by comparing all major networks with rising independent Facebook pages?

That is, who is dominating Facebook in the Philippines? And that’s what we will try to answer.


Facebook versus TV

As of January 2016, there are 48 million Facebook users in the Philippines. Seventy-four percent are over the age of 19. Each Filipino spends 3 hours and 42 minutes on social media every day, as opposed to 2 hours and 33 minutes on television [WeAreSocial]. These figures translate to at least 35.52 million Filipino Facebook users of voting age. Yes, Facebook has become the primary battleground for shaping public opinion.
The methodology of this study is simple. I will analyze analytics data of several Facebook pages collected from Facebook Page Insights. The data used is based on the 7-day period starting from 23 August 2016.

The Facebook pages included in this study are those of mainstream news outlets and several independent politics-themed Facebook pages.

For this study, “mainstream news outlet” refers to pages whose content are supported by a fleet of editors and reporters, and are usually well-financed. Meanwhile, “independent” or “indie” news outlets are pages of independent bloggers, and usually work on reed-thin, often out-of-pocket budgets.

The 25 Facebook pages included in this study are:


Note that I included the custom URLs of each page to prevent confusing these pages with copycat or parody accounts. To visit any of these pages, just type facebook.com/ and append the corresponding custom URL.

Facebook Page Insights Stats

I logged on to my Thinking Pinoy Facebook account and took a video screencap of the data that will be used in this study:
POLITICS: Who dominates Facebook?
I basically discovered that Mocha Uson is actually giving the four major news outlets (ABS-CBN, GMA, Inquirer, and Rappler) a run for their money in the social media game. And so, I thought, why limit it to just five? Why not learn more about the social media wars by comparing all major networks with rising independent Facebook pages?

That is, who is dominating Facebook in the Philippines? And that’s what we will try to answer.
LEARN MORE: http://www.thinkingpinoy.net/2016/08/mainstream-vs-indie-whos-winning-ph.html
Posted by Thinking Pinoy on Monday, August 29, 2016
I typed the data taken from the video above and arranged it into one neat table, as shown below:

For a given page, it appears that Facebook Page Insights calculate data from sample of the top 250 posts from the week-in-question. If a page has fewer than 250 posts, it calculates from the stats of all the posts.

Now, it’s time to do some harmless number-crunching. But first, let me explain how “Facebook Influence” can be measured.

Page Likes versus Page Engagement

Page Likes are important in helping a Facebook page gain a greater audience, the same reason why I celebrate whenever Thinking Pinoy reaches a certain number of total likes. The problem, however, is that page likes are not the be all and end all of social media practitioners.

There’s another extremely important metric: engagement.
Engagement refers to the total number of likes, comments, and shares. In the table in the previous section, the “engagement this week” column refers to the total number of likes, comments, and shares of the posts made during that period.

Let TP explain this through an example:
The national basketball team Smart Gilas Pilipinas is extremely popular, with 2.64 million likes as of 29 August 2016. Now, let’s compare two posts.

A post from yesterday showing Gilas’ international rankings raked in 2,300 post likes, 38 comments, and 22 shares, i.e. approximately 2350 engagement. Meanwhile, A post from today showing an update about Ginebra, a regular PBA team, raked in 454 likes, 21 comments, and 1 share, i.e. approximately 470 engagement.

2350 vs 470? What do the differing engagement stats mean?

People liked the Smart Gilas page because they are interested in Smart Gilas. The first post gained greater engagement because it’s about Gilas while the second gained less because it’s not about Gilas.

What’s the point?

While Facebook page likes are important, engagement is more important because engagement shows how much influence a page exerts on its audience. Who needs a page with 10 million likes but has very few visitors?

Comparing Engagements

Engagement statistics is the primary point of contention in the social media wars, and this is probably the same reason why so much vitriol is being directed at blogger Mocha Uson, as stats show that she has greater engagement than most mainstream news sites.

The following table shows sites with highest engagement:



As we can see, the news giants ABS-CBN and GMANews are still on top, but it’s shocking to discover that Mocha Uson on 4th place, exceeding the respective engagement stats of CNN Philippines, Inquirer, TV5 and Rappler.

Yes, Mocha has over 400% more engagement than the college-sorority-blog-pretending-to-be-a-news-outlet Rappler.com. Actually, four independent pages beat Rappler in terms of engaged user this week: Mocha Uson Blog, Duterte Today, Mindavote, and Lapu-lapu.

Maria Ressa and her Rapplerettes must be losing a lot of sleep lately.

Personally, I also found it interesting that ThinkingPinoy, maintained by a 1-man team (c'est moi~), has higher engagement than Interaksyon, ANC 24/7, PTV, and The Manila Times.

*Ehem*

Engagement per Post

Total engagement stats are important in gauging general influence, but it’s also important to know the average effectiveness of a given page’s posts, and we measure this using the metric “engagement per post”. Engagement per post (EPP) is the measure of whether or not a page’s content is interesting enough for its audience.

EPP is equal to the total number engagements divided by the total number of posts.

If a page's quality is defined as the "interestingness" of posts vis-a-vis the page's audience , then those with higher EPPs post higher-quality Facebook status updates.

Now, let’s look at the pages with the highest EPP figures:


We can see that mainstream media TV show TV Patrol’s page has the highest EPP with 63,500. What’s surprising, however, is Mocha Uson Blog, whose EPP exceeds that of news giants ABS-CBN, GMA, CNN, Inquirer, and TV5.

What’s more shocking?

Indie pages Lapu-lapu, Duterte Today, ThinkingPinoy, and MindaVote, all of whom basically run on virtually no budget, has EPP rates that exceed Rappler, who received funding from investors like North Base Media and the Omidyar Network.

The times are changing, indeed. 

Engagement Rates 

Engagement Rate (ER) is a metric that social media marketers use to measure a brand’s effectiveness at engaging their audience. Basically, ER shows how many of your fans actually gave a damn about what you have posted.

ER is typically calculated by dividing total engagements by total reach, or the total number of people who saw a page’s post [SimplyMeasured].

This formula is impossible to use in the context of this study, as Facebook reach statistics are not available in the Facebook Page Insights analytics tool.

Fortunately, there is an alternative formula for engagement rates where ER equals the total number of engagement over the total number of fans (a.k.a. page likes) [SimplyMeasured].

Here’s the ER Top 15:


Despite drastically lower pages likes, Indie pages occupying six slots in the top 10. That is, these pages appear to offer more compelling (i.e. more engaging) content than most of their peers.

Sass Rogando Sasot, a newly-created page, has an astounding 593% engagement rate. Lapu-lapu is at 2nd with a shade below 300%, and ThinkingPinoy is 3rd with 224%.

Rappler is nowhere to be found in the top 15.

Growth Rates

Engagement growth rate (EGR) can give us an idea about the growth prospects of each page.  In the context of this study, Facebook's EGR is defined as the increased in engagements this week compared to last week.

Here's the EGR Top 15:


Over the past week, Sass Rogando Sasot enjoyed a whopping 161% increase in engagements. ThinkingPinoy and Lapu-lapu gained 15% and 9%, respectively.  This suggests that the three pages are still growing, i.e. they may receive more page likes than the rest.

Rappler, TV5, and many other major news outlets experienced less than 1% growth, suggesting that they may have already saturated their audience.

Essentially, this indicates that indie pages are growing rapidly, and mainstream media is now facing the prospect of obsoletion if they do not shape up.

Note, however, that the Sass Rogando Sasot page is barely a month old, while ThinkingPinoy is just 10 months old. This partly explains the growth stats, as there is still a large room for growth compared to the other pages that have been online for years.

ThinkingPinoy's takeaways

These numbers can be confusing, especially for those who hate Math.So let me give you a recap of what was discussed.
First, indie pages appear to offer more engaging content compared to mainstream pages.
Note, however,  that this has nothing to do with the veracity or truthfulness of what they post. This is why it is important for readers to verify information before believing what's written on their posts. This is the same reason why I meticulously insert hyperlinks and citations within every post in ThinkingPinoy, so I can let my readers read the sources for themselves and come up with their own conclusions.

Second, fans of indie pages are more passionate than fans of mainstream pages.
Imagine this: Mocha Uson has 4 million followers and 37.5% engagement rate while ABS-CBN has 11.7 million followers and a 16% engagement rate. If there were a People Power Revolution next week, which page is more likely to convince more people to join its cause?

Third, engagement numbers of indie pages are starting to rival mainstream pages.
The growth of indie pages generally outpace the growth of mainstream pages, suggesting that there might come a time when these indie pages may enter the mainstream and kick today's mainstream pages to the sidelines.  

For mainstream media, these three conclusions are alarming vis-a-vis the 2022 presidential elections to be held six years from now. By that time, there will be 48 million Filipino Facebook users whose political opinions may be shaped primarily by independent influencers.

Actually, that prediction might have already come true during the 2016 Presidential Elections where, despite the most vicious attacks from mainstream media (Remember the tasteless Trillanes-sponsored TV ad featuring kids?), the political outsider Rodrigo Duterte still managed to win by landslide.

Whether we want to admit it or not, Mocha Uson should be largely credited for Duterte's online dominance.

The rise of independent pages is the rise of independent thinking, where political commentators can speak their mind more freely than those who belong to mainstream organizations.

This is the first time in history that virtually any Filipino with a cheap smartphone can make his voice heard, with no editorial teams and no business interests to prevent him from doing so.

Indie pages, managed by regular people, now have a voice that can influence millions of Filipinos.

This is democracy at work.
 
Aika Robredo may not not very happy with it.

And apparently, Rappler too.


Ah, democracy, thou art a heartless b!tch.


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How to destroy Rodrigo Duterte

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You hate Duterte, I get it. I do not respect the fact that you hate Duterte, but I respect your right to hate him. Believing that he still doesn’t deserve to be the president despite a landslide win, you desperately want to bring him down. I get that too.

But over and over you fail, and I am starting to feel bad for you. That’s why this time, I am going to help you do exactly what you want to do.

A quick stroll down memory lane

Let me start by refreshing your memory about the first five attempts at destroying Rodrigo Duterte.

First, there was the “P.I. Pope” issue in November 2015. It didn’t work because cursing is not a big deal for the poor masses where I belong [TP: Tatang], while the rich and middle class feel that there are more important issues to worry about.

Second, there was the “Rape Joke” issue [TP: Distasteful]. It didn’t work because a foul-mouthed president is better than one who coddles rapists [TP: Jalosjos].

Third, there was the “BPI Julia Vargas” issue [TP: BangkoSerye]. It didn’t work because Duterte has gained the Teflon effect [TP: Waiver Game], the evidence turned out to be double hearsay [TP: Sampalan], and the evidence contradicts itself [TP: Scenarios].

Fourth, there was the “PCOS” issue [TP: Smartmatic]. It didn’t work because Duterte’s lead is so large, (1) there’s no way people will believe he wouldn’t win and (2) the lead overwhelmed any potential cheating. Not for Bongbong Marcos, though [TP: Obsolete].

Fifth, there was “Plan B”, where Duterte would have been removed through impeachment. It didn’t work as Duterte managed to secure 9 senator-allies, making the two-thirds majority required for conviction in an impeachment trial impossible to attain [TP: Mark Villar].

Five major attempts and so far, none worked. These painful and repeated failures have frustrated many people, to a point where they just throw in the “disente” towel and go full blast.

The Frustration of “The Other Side”

Rappler, the college sorority blog known for its hyper-opinionated bloggers [TP: Pia Rañada], won’t qualify as an example. Instead, I am talking about those who feigned impartiality in the past several months, only to amuse the public by crying like babies who saw Edgar Erice’s face.
Just look at erstwhile respectable Professor Walden Bello who was caught, pants down, calling 91% of Filipinos ignorant and stupid [Star, Minda] . He wasn’t sorry for it and he gloriously succeeded, in the succeeding days [FB], to reinforce his newly-built reputation for assholery.

Then there’s Al Jazeera’s Jamela Alindogan who cheapened the deaths of fifteen soldiers [FB] in the war against the Abu Sayyaf by blaming it on Duterte’s supposed misdecision. It appears Alindogan expects that the Abu Sayyaf will talk peace with Duterte over tea.

Yes, I chose to support Duterte in the May 2016 elections. However, there’s a part of me that feels sympathy for the opposition that has been repeatedly trying its best to destroy the man and repeatedly failing miserably time and time again.

That’s why I am going to teach you how to destroy him, because I am starting to feel genuine pity for you guys.

SERIOUSLY.

Duterte the Murderer?

You’re trying to destroy Duterte again and this time, it’s the EJK issue.

You say Duterte is a mass murderer after the death of 2000 people during the war on drugs. Your ally, Sen. Leila de Lima, was so convinced of this despite her chronic failure to show – since 2009 – Duterte’s involvement in the Davao Death Squads [TP: Ooh, Ronnie!].

De Lima called for a senate investigation, and everybody she invited from the Duterte camp attended. Two days’ worth of grandstanding was fruitless, as not a single testimony, not a single piece of evidence, showed that Duterte ordered those deaths [TP: Chito Gascon].
Despite the lack of evidence, you still insist that he sanctions vigilante killings because you held him to his word. I think you will agree with TV5’s Atty Mel Sta. Maria when he said in Filipino yesterday [Radyo5]:
President Duterte should be firm and say, “Arrest all drug pushers,” but he shouldn’t say, “I do not care about Human Rights (of criminals).”
Adding Hontiveros’ statement that the president’s statements have “the force and effect of policy”, you are basically telling us that despite the lack of a formal announcement, his words against criminals de facto emboldened the police to kill suspects at will.

This kind of reasoning is problematic because it does not resonate with the masses.

Let me tell you why.

The Language of the Masses

Overanalyzing Duterte’s statements won’t work and the sooner you accept that reality, the better. I thought you’ve already learned that after the P.I. Pope scandal [TP: Tatang], but you didn’t. I thought you’ve learned that after the Rape Joke scandal [TP:Jalosjos], but you haven’t.

We all speak Taglish, Duterte included. However, what mainstream media still doesn’t get is that Duterte speaks Taglish that matches the wavelength of the masses, especially those who grew up poor, underprivileged, the whole nine yards. This is starkly different from the sanitized, prim-and-proper Taglish that most wealthy and highly-educated Filipinos (or those pretending to be such) use.Luchi Cruz-Valdez brilliantly explained this point yesterday when she said [Radyo5]:
“Nakuha niya (Duterte) kasi ang lenggwahe ng masa… Kung likas kang Pilipino, tubong Pilipino ka… lalo na grassroots…mage-gets mo pati jokes niya e… nasasakyan…kaya ganoong kalawak ang mass base niya, really. Kasi nasasakyan nila, alam nila kapag nagjo-joke lang ‘yan, alam din nila kapag, ‘Oi, seryoso ‘yan,’ alam din nila kung nagbo-borderline (offensive) siya.”
[Translation: He speaks the language of the masses. If you’re a common Filipino, especially if you’re from the grassroots, you’ll catch the drift, even his jokes. That’s how he got his massive mass base, really. Because the masses understand him. They know when he’s joking, they also know when he’s serious, they also know when he’s borderline (offensive).]
You know what, I actually think you do understand the language issue but you are still denying it. Yes, you have all the freedom to think whatever you’re thinking. However, the fact remains that engaging the masses means having to play in their arena, not yours.

And what do you want? Sway their opinions to your favor.

Swaying Public Opinion

There’s one key concept here that you need to keep in mind: Public Opinion.

That is, if you want to destroy Duterte, you need to destroy his public image. If you want to destroy his public image, you have to be able to communicate with the masses. You should not just aim for the masses to hear you, you should make them listen to you.

We are not talking anymore about what’s the morally right way to speak. I’ll leave that to Rappler, the self-proclaimed morality police. Instead, I am talking about speaking in a way that people will actually listen.

And this how you do it:

First, stop pissing off the majority.

No, I am not talking about the self-proclaimed “Silent Majority” because 9% by no means constitutes a majority. I am talking about the 40% who voted for him, plus the 51% who decided to support him after he won. If you continue calling us idiots, ignoramuses, retards, and the like, you might as well look forward to six more years of teeth-gnashing and hair-pulling.

Second, stop nitpicking his statements.

Whether you think he really meant it or not doesn’t matter: it’s how the masses interpret his statement that does. Instead of wondering why “the masses are so clueless”, you should ask why they caught his drift while you did not. Why? Making a big deal out of an otherwise simple statement will make the masses see you as a fool, and no one likes listening to fools.

Third, be sincere and straightforward.

The masses know you don’t like Duterte so they would naturally be suspicious of everything you say. Just like in social media marketing, sincerity and empathy (or at least, what appears to be such) are the currencies of politics. People don’t like talking to people that they feel they need to second-guess. Yes, your need to second-guess Duterte’s words may be one of the reasons you didn’t vote for him, but the tables have turned after May 9th. The 91% percent’s need to second-guess your statements will just make your job harder to do.

To make this easier to understand, let’s apply these three tips to the EJK issue, your sixth and latest attempt to kick him out of the national scene.

Did Duterte order the "murders"?

The extrajudicial killings (EJK) issue, the sixth and latest attempt, shows a lot of promise, if done right.

First, stop calling Duterte supporters names.

I am not against name-calling per se, but the truth of the matter is you can’t convince someone to change sides if the first thing you do is piss him off [TP:Ed Lingao]. If you continue displaying disdain for Duterte supporters, then you are just wasting precious time, money, and saliva.

Second, stop using his statements against him.

We, his supporters, admit that he has a foul mouth, but we believe that he more than makes up for it with real, tangible, and substantial results.

Hence, use his actual actions instead. If you want to prove that Duterte is a mass murderer, show us that he actually ordered police to kill innocent people, or that he actually tolerated police abuses. You haven’t done that so far.

Third, stop telling us that you’re on our side.

You are not fooling anyone. As a Duterte supporter, I would rather hear someone talk smack about me in front of my face rather than hear someone who spews bullshit. Duterte won because of the things he did, and not by the way he talks. Hence, to destroy him, show evidence based on the things that really did, and not based from the things he said.

Show us a policeman who killed an innocent but was subsequently pardoned. Give us a video or audio clip showing Duterte ordering cops to unlawfully kill people. Show us that saving a criminal’s life and saving our own lives are not mutually exclusive.

Why? Because you haven’t shown any of those so far.

ThinkingPinoy’s Bottom-line

I, ThinkingPinoy, am not a newsperson right now. I am just a lowly anonymous blogger who belongs to the masses. I am just a regular Filipino who writes about what I think. Nothing more and nothing less. I am not sure if you’ve been following my blog but I have read Facebook comments saying I have changed from a decent and courteous blogger to someone who writes incendiary posts almost every day. In short, I have allegedly become  an "indencent" blogger, whatever that means.

Why? Because I have run out of patience for dealing with people like you.

However, I am still trying to reach out to you because I want real opposition to the Duterte administration. And when I say “real”, I mean an opposition that actually makes sense to me and to the rest of the masses, not the kind of overreacting, self-entitled opposition that the country has today.

Now, if you still don’t get what I mean, just avoid these 10 no-no’s:
  1. Do not do a [TP: Pia Rañada], i.e. no superiority complex please.
  2. Do not do a [TP: Paterno Esmaquel], i.e. no cyberbullying please.
  3. Do not do a [TP: Albert del Rosario], no hidden motives please.
  4. Do not do a [TP: Karen Davila], i.e. no deceitfulness please.
  5. Do not do a [TP: Antonio Trillanes], i.e. no false evidence please.
  6. Do not do a [TP: Leila de Lima], i.e. no hypocrisy please.
  7. Do not do a [TP: Chito Gascon], i.e. no bullshit please.
  8. Do not do a [TP: Aika Robredo], i.e. no unfounded claims please.
  9. Do not do a [TP: Noynoy Aquino], i.e. no laziness and incompetence please; and most importantly,
  10. Do not do a [TP: Leni Robredo], i.e. no ignorance please.

Because in as far as your political interests are concerned, doing any of these ten will do you more harm than good.

In reaction to this article, you may say:
  • That's too difficult!
  • That's too complicated! 
  • That's too unreasonable!
  • That's too numerous!
  • That's too unfair!
Well, that's your problem, not mine. It's you who needs something from the masses, and not the other way around. But if you manage to do all these, then alright, let's talk. [ThinkingPinoy]

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#KungAkoSiRody: Sen. Leila De Lima liable for “Inciting to Sedition”?

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Duterte’s controversial War on Drugs has riled international opinion, thanks to the efforts of former Justice Secretary and now Senator Leila de Lima.


On 31 August 2016, ultra-idealist United States Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power, an influential voice in US Foreign Policy, tweeted:
“Alarming reports of ongoing extrajudicial killings in #Philippines; government must respect human r(igh)ts & rule of law [Power].”

Given sufficient backing from her peers, Power is not the kind of person who would think twice about urging the US to intervene in the Philippines.

Power, along with National Security Adviser Susan Rice and State Secretary Hillary Clinton, are the main culprits behind US President Barack Obama’s decision to invade Libya to oust long-time dictator Moammar Gadhafi.

What happened to Libya after the invasion?

Timothy Carney of the [Washington Examiner] wrote in 2014:
“President Obama illegally invaded Libya, overthrew Moammar Gadhafi, and then – due to politics – left a power vacuum that terrorists filled, turning Libya into a hotbed of jihadist groups.”
Simply put:
“Gaddafi ruled over Libya and the US kicked him out. Today, instead of a dictator, Libya is now being ruled by terrorists.”
What’s the point? Power pictures Duterte as another Gaddafi.

What gave Power the idea?

Simply put, if Power gets her way, this will be the situation in 2022:
“Duterte ruled over the Philippines and the US kicked him out. Today, instead of what the US believes to be a dictator, the Philippines is now being ruled by drug cartels, terrorists, separatists, and the Grand ‘Ole Oligarchy.“
The Philippine opposition continuously failed, since 2009, to find evidence pinning vigilante killings on Duterte [TP: Ronnie Dayan]. This includes plus their failure to find the same in a recently concluded Senate investigation [TP: Destroy Duterte].

Despite this, the opposition has been drumming up international support over the past several months in its crusade to bring down the newly-installed populist anti-Oligarch President Rodrigo Duterte [TP: Oligarchy].

Members of the Philippine mainstream media can be largely credited for this increased international attention, as reporters of oligarch-owned or -controlled news outlets moonlight as wire reporters of international news agencies like AFP, AP, and Reuters. Foreign news outlets largely base their international news content on these wire reports.

A recent revelation, however, shows that Filipino wire reporters do not deserve all the credit for this international uproar: there’s someone else.

Enter Senator De Lima

Aryeh Neier, President Emeritus of the Open Society Foundations and a founder of Human Rights Watch, has just written article ending with:
“One prominent Philippine political figure, Leila de Lima, a senator and former justice minister, is already calling on the ICC to take action... The fact that a popular head of state is trampling the rule of law in the Philippines makes a fast, decisive response all the more necessary [ProjSynd].”
No less than a founder of the Human Rights is calling for international action on the Philippines.
Yes, Neier is calling for foreign intervention, thanks largely to Senator Leila de Lima.

Just recently, De Lima spoke to CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, where she further hammered in, despite the lack of evidence [TP: President Leni], her allegations of Duterte’s complicity with the recent spate of extrajudicial killings [CNN].

The Liberal Party’s General Strategy

Duterte’s anti-corruption, anti-crime platform of government has ruffled, is ruffling, will ruffle a lot of feathers in the Liberal Party (LP), where Senator de Lima belongs.

It all started with Duterte’s anti-illegal mining policies that hit LP’s previously erstwhile invincible mining cronies [TP: Mining Cronies]. And now, with his massive war on drugs, Duterte – if not stopped – will cut off the alleged primary source of LP funding: the Drug Cartel [TP: Jesse Robredo].

Hence the viciousness of LP’s attacks, with de Lima serving as their attack dog (or attack pig).
But then, “Dog” is a masculine word and Rappler’s Prof. Sylvia Claudio is so particular about grammar [TP: Grammar Nazi], so let me oblige her by rewording the previous sentence.

Hence the viciousness of LP’s attacks, with de Lima serving as their attack BITCH.

Prof. Claudio, are you happy now?

De Lima and her friends in the Liberal Party failed to destroy Duterte’s campaign [TP: Tatang, TP: Jalosjos, TP: Scenarios]. They also failed to cheat him in the elections [TP: Smartmatic]. They also failed to impeach him [TP: Villar]. And so far, they have failed in rousing local public opinion over the EJK issue [TP: Gascon].

As you can probably see, the de Lima has run out of local options in as far as destroying Duterte, so she, along with former Liberal Party Director-General and Human Rights Chair Chito Gascon, decided to look elsewhere.

But there’s a problem in this phase of the LP strategy. A big, legal, problem.

The Limits of Free Speech

A senator is part of the legislature, which is co-equal in power with the Executive. Thus, while I do not agree with De Lima’s actions prior to the International Criminal Court issue, I respect her right to express her dissent and her right use every remedy afforded to her by the Constitution.

Being the accuser with the burden of proof, de Lima blatantly ignored the need to discount the possibility of false or planted evidence, and proceeded with her campaign at destroying the country’s international reputation. Despite her full knowledge that she has no valid evidence against Duterte so far, she still decided to cross international political boundaries just to make things happen for her and her cohorts.

A Filipino democracy is where power is vested in the Filipino people [Dictionary], and the Filipino people decided to value Free Speech, and that’s what de Lima purportedly exercises right now.

However, Free Speech “does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom [People vs Nabong]."

At this point, it’s clear that the Sovereign Will of the People favors Duterte. As a citizen and as a legislator, the best she is allowed to do is erode public opinion of Duterte and hope that things will go her way. She clearly realized that this won’t happen, that’s why she decided to seek foreign intervention, squarely circumventing the will of the real Philippine majority.
Inciting to Sedition

Let’s be clear about this: De Lima wants ICC to intervene and the only way ICC can intervene is by putting the Duterte government under trial.

[Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code] states:
“The crime of sedition is committed by persons (who)… prevent… any public officer… from freely exercising… his functions, or prevent the execution of any administrative order...”
Meanwhile, [Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code] states:
“Inciting to Sedition. - The penalty of prision correctional… shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings… or other representations tending to the same end…”

What do these imply?

If a representative of the ICC somehow manages to put Duterte on trial, it’s obvious the ICC would prevent Duterte, the President, from exercising his constitutional functions. That would be sedition.

Now, who incites ICC to sedition? De Lima, through her nonstop speeches against the Duterte administration, alleging that Duterte sanctions extrajudicial killings despite the lack of evidence of such.

Yes, the Aguirre’s DoJ can actually sue de Lima for inciting to sedition, and eventually have her placed behind bars, just like what de Lima to then-Senators Enrile, Revilla, and Estrada. The de Lima-Amanpour interview was not made during a Senate Session, so she cannot invoke parliamentary immunity.

#KungAkoSiRody: Political Considerations

At this point, ThinkingPinoy is not arguing anymore about what’s morally right and what’s morally wrong. I am now putting on my political observer hat, put myself in the Duterte’ administration’s shoes, and evaluate my administration’s prospects.

That is, I will pretend to be Duterte starting now.

I, President Rodrigo Duterte, can actually sue de Lima for inciting to sedition, but the reality is that there are other political factors to consider [TP: Game of Thrones].

First: Political Ammunition for the Opposition

The opposition can use de Lima’s prospective detention as political ammunition, similar to how the Manila Times counter-attacked the Arroyo administration after the latter sued them for the same [CMFR].

At this point, de Lima’s popularity is in the gutter, so why would I lift her up from where she is?

Second: De Lima the “martyr"

Inciting to sedition will transform de Lima from a Senator into a political prisoner (i.e. a martyr), diverting attention from a more serious case – her alleged complicity with the drug trade– that would elicit far less international sympathy for her.

If I sue her right now, she can use the “victim card” and pretend to be the portlier version of Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi. I do not want that.

Third: Supreme Court "cooperation"

Each Supreme Court Justice may have their own personal motives, but the fact remains that there is no real assurance that I will get a favorable verdict on the case. If I lose the case, this may become a political embarrassment that I may never recover from.

I can choose to file a case in 2019, when I have already appointed at least 10 justices into the High Court [TP: Supreme Court Math], so that will, at least slightly, tip the scales to my favor. However, 2019 is still far off, so it may be too late.

Proposed Course of Action

I, President Rodrigo Duterte, shall adopt the following plan:

First, stir controversy to buy a little time.

I will first stir controversy to make the public busy while I finish gathering evidence and preparing a case in connection with De Lima’s drug links. The driver-lover issue was enough to keep them busy for two weeks, the drug matrix two weeks, the works.

Second, file a drug-related case

A month should be enough to buy me enough time to file a case with Justice Secretary Aguirre’s help. If de Lima gets detained for drug-related offenses, there’s a fair chance that she will lose her international voice. I am pretty confident that this can keep her locked in for good.

The regional trial courts are unlikely dismiss such a complaint for lack of probable cause because of two reasons: (a) I am not de Lima so I will not file a flimsy case and (b) these RTC judges have ambitions of becoming a Supreme Court Justice, and it just so happens that there are at least 10 available SC slots during my term.

Third, let the case drag on.

This doesn’t require a lot of effort. Like every Filipino, I know it will take years before the drug-related de Lima case reaches the Supreme Court. And even if, by some miracle, the case does reach the court in four years, September 2020, where I would have appointed 10 justices in the Supreme Court, probably including the RTC judge who would convict de Lima.

Fourth, get insurance.

As an insurance against contingencies, I can file an “inciting to sedition” case to keep her behind bars. Yes, there’s no way de Lima can get out of this scot-free.

And you know what’s funny? I learned this strategy from them.

How? Because it’s the same thing they did to PGMA[TP:GMA Acquit].

The difference?

They didn’t win, but I will.[ThinkingPinoy]

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Something's Fishy: Bogs Obuyes and the Deposit Slips

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I woke up this morning of 02 September 2016 and stumbled upon a Philippine Star exclusive that stated [Star]:
“A bank document obtained by The STAR from a DOJ source showed that a total of P24 million in cash was deposited in a bank account under the name of Bogs C. Obuyes in March and April 2014.”
Edna “Bogs” Obuyes was Senator Leila de Lima’s staff member while the latter was still the secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Then I felt like something's wrong.


NOTE: Obuyes is obviously a transgender man, so we will use male pronouns to address him throughout this article. 
The Philippine Star provided photos of the deposit slips, as shown  below:


A cursory look at the document, obtained from an anonymous DOJ source, shows several tell-tale signs of fraud.

FIRST,  18 April 2014 falls on a Good Friday, a bank holiday, so an over-the-counter bank transaction could not have been consummated on that day.

SECOND, "Bogs" is a nickname and banks require accountholders to use their real names.

THIRDAND MOST IMPORTANTLY, "Diposits (sic)" and "₱24,000,000.00 millions  (sic)" are glaring typographical errors that are not likely to be committed by presumably well-educated DoJ employees. Any self-respecting DOJ employee, especially if acting with Aguirre's imprimatur, would not have committed such glaring grammatical and spelling errors in a document of such importance.

Yes, something smells fishy.

Denials and Denials

A little before noon, I discovered a post from what presumably is Bogs Obuyes' personal facebook account. The post is as follows [FB]:


Obuyes' post quickly went viral. The knee-jerk reaction here would be, "Wow, DOJ is so desperate to pin Sen. de Lima that they even resorted to manufacturing evidence!"

A couple of hours later, current Justice Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre said in Filipino, “We are still verifying those documents because we do not want to be embarrassed [Star].”On one hand, the DOJ may have fabricated evidence. But on the other hand, it might be a trap that DOJ's opponents have set up.

So who's telling the truth?

A closer look at the documents shows some rather startling clues.

For the record, this article was written on 02 September 2016 at 5:00 PM.

Why is that important? Because the trick here is in the timestamps.

1: Time and Date of Publication

The Philippine Star said they got the deposit slips from an unnamed DOJ source, so their story should be an exclusive, i.e. they are the first news outlet to publish this story. The time stamp on the Philippine Star article states "



This suggests that the time difference between the the first version and the second version shouldn't be too long. Why? Because updating an article does not reset the comments section. Surely, if the article was published during the daytime of 01 September 2016, somebody else would've already commented before that Ros Feliciano person.

Now, another tell-tale sign is in the hidden data of the graphic used in this article, which is the photo of the deposit slips. It is safe to assume that the photos were already there in the 1st version, and that the update merely affected textual content. Why? Because the photos are the most essential element to make such a leak credible.
Now, this is what I did:
  1. Using Mozilla Firefox, I right-clicked on the photo of the deposit slip then selected "Copy Image Location".
  2. On a new tab,  I pasted the image's address and pressed Enter.
  3. The image loaded then I right-clicked the image again then selected "View Image Info"
This is the popup window that I saw:

The popup window indicates that the graphic was created at 11:22 PM of September 1st, implying that the original version of this Philippine Star article was published somewhere between 11:22PM and 11:58PM of 01 September 2016.

For the record, the original Star article was published after 11:00 PM of 01 September 2016.

2: Obuyes' Denial

According to his Facebook wall, Obuyes denial was posted on Facebook at 4:22 AM of 01 September 2016. Clicking the time stamp on that post shows a different time stamp: 4:22PM of 01 September 2016.


Whichever way it goes, it is clear that Obuyes' denial was issued on or before 4:22 PM of 01 September 2016.

For the record, this is what Obuyes wrote:
"to all my friends and relatives, ako man po ay nabigla at napasama po ako sa isyung ito, nung pinatawag po ko sa loob ng office ni sec. aguirre masaya po akong pumasok sa akala kung pipirma po ako ng bagong contract. pero laking gulat ko na ang inihain sa harapan ko ay bdo bank receipt amounting 24 million for the month of march and april 2014, kalakip ng mga pictures namin ni senator de lima. na yung time na yan nasa chr pa po ko. at ang pangalan ko dun ay bogs c obuyes, na imposible ko namang gamitin yun dahil nickname ko lang po un. sobra na tama na. maawa na sana sila kay sen.LML. ang laman ng statement ko po ay puro pag tatanggi na walang katotohanan ang lahat. pero bakit ang lumalabas ay against sen. de lima na ang statement ko. pls... pray for me and for our sen. LML."

3: Mismatching Information

I have explained that the glaring spelling and grammatical errors show that it could not have possibly been leaked by DOJ. Aguirre has been successfully defending Duterte since time immemorial and it just goes to show how good a lawyer he is. Moreover, the date stamp 18 April 2014 would have automatically made the evidence invalid, as it was a bank holiday on that day.
Duterte eats court cases for breakfast with Aguirre as his metaphorical "yaya", so an error as glaring as this is impossible. Aguirre couldn't be that careless. It would have been possible if bar flunker Leni Robredo [TP: LNMB] was DOJ Chief , but she isn't.

In short, somebody else leaked it, and it's not with Aguirre's permission.

With that said, and assuming that Obuyes was indeed interrogated by Aguirre prior to the Star leak, Aguirre could not have possible showed Obuyes the deposit slips. Why? Because the deposit slips are questionable as it is, and it will just give Obuyes (and by extension, de Lima) more reason to attack Aguirre's credibility.

Thus, I cannot help but ask:
  1. How can Obuyes deny the deposit slips whose existence he should not have known about?
  2. How convenient is it that just several hours later, the broadsheet published an exclusive on the the same exact deposit slips in question?
Now, these questions hinge on the assumption that Aguirre is a decent lawyer.

However, some camps may still argue that Aguirre may have slipped, so I ask:
  1. And why did Obuyes refuse Aguirre's request to undergo a polygraph (lie detector) test [GMA]?
  2. How can Obuyes, a mere clerk and non-regular employee, have the guts to defy the sitting Justice Secretary?
  3. Is he being protected by a "higher power", such as his former boss?

The Napoles Tactic


In May 2014, then-President Benigno Aquino III defended Cabinet members named in Janet Lim-Napoles extended affidavit, insinuating that the multiple copies of the list are meant to delay the investigation [Inq].

The Napoles Pork Barrel Scam has been fraught with controversy, as some of Aquino's cabinet members were implicated in some of the versions of the list. Included in one of the lists was former Budget Secretary Butch Abad, who allegedly taught Napoles how to set up foundations as funnels for pork barrel [TP: FOI].

In short, the group who leaked multiple "Napolists" might be the Liberal Party itself, in an attempt to confuse the public and allow them the opportunity to choose the version which best suits their party's interests.

And just recently, Duterte linked de Lima to the same Napoles case [Star].

This leads me to suspect someone is using the same tactic today.

And I have a pretty good idea who it is [ThinkingPinoy].


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#KanTalk with Sass and TP: Episode Guide and Download Links

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#KanTalk is podcast-slash-almost-radio-show where International Relations scholar Sass Rogando Sasot and notoriously anonymous political observer Thinking Pinoy talk about the latest issues in the Philippine political arena.

The following is a list of all KanTalk episodes, including download links. This blog post will be regularly updated to include new KanTalk episodes.



#KanTalk Episode 01 (Pilot) | Extrajudicial Killings | 01-Sept-16 


Episode 01 Topics: Extrajudicial Killings | Senate Hearings | Rappler | Leila de Lima | Walden Bello | Chito Gascon | International Opinion | International Criminal Court | Presidential Communications (Government of the Philippines)

  1. Listen to this Episode on Facebook 
  2. Download MP3 from Google Drive
  3. Mirror 1: Download MP3 from SaberCatHost
  4. Mirror 2: Download MP3 from Mega.NZ

#KanTalk Episode 02 | Davao Bombing | 03-Sept-16 


Episode 02 Topics: Rody Duterte and the Davao City Bombing | State of Lawlessness | Abu Sayyaf links w/ 14K Triad | Plan ICC | Bogs Obuyes and the Deposit Slips | Extrajudicial Killings | Russia | Leila de Lima's Political Prospects | Geopolitics

  1. Listen to this Episode on Facebook 
  2. Download MP3 from Google Drive
  3. Mirror 1: Download MP3 from SaberCatHost
  4. Mirror 2: Download MP3 from Mega.NZ

#KanTalk Episode 03 | Bombing Suspects, ASEAN Summit | 05 Sept 16

Episode 03 Topics: Potential Suspects | ASEAN Summit | Rappler | US Foreign Policy | Geopolitics |
  1. Listen to this Episode on Facebook 
  2. Download MP3 from Google Drive
  3. Mirror 1: Download MP3 from Mega.NZ

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Potential Suspects: Who bombed Davao City?

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The Roxas Night Market is an extremely popular hangout place for Davaoeños. Located at the heart of downtown Davao, locals flock the place to find cheap and delicious eats, oftentimes in the company of family and friends. Its setup is similar to the Banchetto in Mandaluyong’s Ortigas Center and the Midnight Mercato in Taguig’s Bonifacio Global City.

September 2nd, a Friday, was another fun-filled day for Roxas Night Market regulars. That is, until around 10:00 PM when a bomb exploded, killing at least 14 people and injuring at least 60 others [ABS]. The entire nation was in shock. How can something like this happen in no less than the President’s home town?



Potential Suspects

Davao City is close to my heart, and I have been grieving for two days. While I was born and raised in Luzon, it was my three years in Davao City that taught me how to be human. While I was born Tagalog, my heart is totally Bisaya.

But now that the smoke has slightly cleared, it is time to analyze the fateful incident and see what can be done about it. At this point, I will set aside everything I feel about the incident and examine the situation using nothing but logic and history. Specifically, I will list down all the potential suspects, and examine, based on past news articles, the probability of each entity on the list being the actual culprit. Note that this is just a tentative list, but any investigation needs a starting point, and this is it.

This bears repeating: I will set aside all my emotions for now and I will evaluate the list as objectively as I can. Now, let’s tentatively list down the possible suspects.
  1. Duterte Administration
  2. The Liberal Party
  3. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
  4. Drug Cartels
  5. The United States
  6. China
This is a pretty diverse list, right?

Let's start.

1st Suspect: Duterte Administration

This is the Yellow Fan Favorite.

Some members of the opposition would expectedly try to pin this incident on Duterte, as it can be compared to the August 1971 Plaza Miranda Bombing that killed nine and injured 95, mostly oppositionist Liberal Party supporters [LP]. The Liberal Party blamed then-President Ferdinand Marcos for the incident, alleging that the latter used it to justify the imposition of Martial Law [MT].

Incidentally, it’s also the Liberal Party who’s in the opposition today. And this is what they would like us to believe this angle, especially since they are fond of painting Duterte as a megalomaniacal dictator-wannabe.

But there’s a problem.
FIRST, Duterte has no thirst for power. Duterte has been offered the DILG post by former presidents Ramos, Estrada, Aquino, and Arroyo, and he declined all of them [AC, Inq], despite his full knowledge that the DILG post is the perfect springboard for running for higher office.

Duterte was also offered to be the 2016 vice-presidential running mate of Roxas [GMA] and Binay [GMA], but he declined. He was continuously pushed to run for president, but he declined every time, even going as far as saying only an alien abduction of Roxas, Binay, and Poe, will force to make him run [Inq], and it was only a last-minute large-scale, grassroots call for him to run [GMA] that finally changed his mind.

No, these are not the deeds of someone who’s hungry for power.

SECOND, Davao City is Duterte’s obra maestra. The man spent thirty years transforming an economic backwater into a booming cosmopolitan city. With Duterte’s leadership, what was once a killing field in the late ‘80s turned into a safe and secure city with a vibrant economy [Edge].

At 71, it’s unlikely that he can leave a legacy more prominent than that, so why would he mess it up?

THIRD, Duterte’s family lives in Davao. Why would he bomb a city where his children and grandchildren live? Why would he turn it into a hell-hole? It does not make sense.

If he really wanted to bomb a city for his alleged political motives, he would’ve bombed NCR cities instead. If I were Duterte and I wanted to a sequel to the Plaza Miranda Bombing, I would’ve bombed the Araneta Center, where the Liberal Party Headquarters is. But it isn’t the case.

So no, Duterte probably didn’t do it.

2nd Suspect: The Liberal Party

Many Duterte Die-hard Supporters say the Liberal Party did it. After all, the bombing fits perfectly into their plan. Despite the lack of evidence [TP: Gascon], the Liberal Party has managed to convince the international community that Duterte is a megalomaniac. With the bombing, and assuming that Duterte will declare Martial Law as a result, then LP would have succeeded in making him look not only megalomaniacal, but also dictatorial.

From the LP's point of view, this also happens to be the perfect diversion. The public has been feasting on LP Senator Leila de Lima and her alleged drug links, so the LP could have possibly copied former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile’s alleged Zamboanga Siege Tactic [Inq].

There is one major issue with this theory, however.
There is no evidence so far that suggests LP’s complicity in the Davao City bombing incident. I am not Leila de Lima, so I do not like accusing without sufficient evidence. Yes, the motives are there, but motives alone are not enough to prove criminal liability.

LP as a potential suspect? Yes.

LP as the most probable suspect? No, not yet.

3rd Suspect: Abu Sayyaf Group

Prior to the incident, Duterte said the government has received threats from the IS-linked terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) [TP: Video]. The Philippine National Police (PNP) also blamed ASG for the bombing incident [AlJazeera].

Yesterday, ABS-CBN reported that ASG owned up to the Davao blast [ABS]. The problem, however, is the fact that ABS-CBN failed to include a direct quote from ASG’s spokesman categorically saying that ASG did it. Not surprisingly, CNN reported this morning that ASG’s spokesman categorically denied ASG alleged involvement in the bombing incident [CNN].

I hate to admit it, but ASG’s denial makes some sense. Let me explain why.

FIRST, shrapnel found in the blast site are similar to ones found after the 2003 Sasa Wharf and Davao Airport Bombings [Sun.Star]. While this may qualify as circumstantial evidence, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are relatively low-tech bombs so the technology used in them is hardly proprietary. That is, even if the ASG can create such an IED, other groups can create similarly-designed IEDs too.

SECOND, ThinkingPinoy received a PNP internal memo dated 26 August 2016 that warns local police stations of a possible ASG bomb plot in Davao or Metro Manila. The memo is shown below:

The memo mentions suicide bombers. However, Davao was bombed using a standalone IED. That is, the PNP may be talking about a bomb threat that’s totally separate from whatever happened last Friday.

THIRD and most importantly, Abu Sayyaf has never denied involvement with terrorist activities before.

Terrorists feed on terrifying the populace, so it’s just logical for them to own up to any successfully perpetrated terrorists attack. After all, that’s just like getting extra street cred for free. I searched for any page published before 01 September 2016 that contains “Abu Sayyaf denies” [Google], and not a single article showed such an ASG denial in the past.

What’s the point? If ASG denied involvement, then it may actually be, at least partially, true.

The Duterte government has already been waging war on ASG for several weeks now, with Duterte reportedly planning to ramp up troops two days before the bombing incident [WSJ].

If I were the ASG, I would prefer a long protracted guerrilla war where troops trickle in, instead of an all-out government offensive that may overwhelm my terrorist forces. If I were ASG, I can more manageably resist government forces that way.

What would bombing Davao City do? That may just coax Duterte on going full-force against ASG, and that’s the last thing ASG wants, and that’s exactly what happened when Duterte announced Saturday – a few hours after the Davao bombing – that he will send 7,000 troops to eradicate ASG.

While I cannot totally discount ASG’s involvement, the latter’s spokesterrorist actually makes at least a little sense when he denied the group’s involvement.

4th Suspect: Drug Cartels

Regardless of whether you’re for or against Duterte’s war on drugs, the fact remains that it has yielded very tangible results, one of which is decreasing profit margins for drug syndicates [TP: PH Drug Industry].

Some may argue that bombings is not the style of drug cartels but the US military says otherwise [US Mil].

Now, Duterte is pretty difficult to assassinate, having survived terrorist-infested Mindanao for over 70 years. Thus, drug cartels can, at least for now, attempt to destabilize his government by bombing no less than his home town.

This is a very interesting angle given that three inmates bolted a North Cotabato prison just two weeks ago. These inmates were facing charges of illegal possession of explosives and illegal drugs [Inq].

Three drug dealers who happen to know something about explosives magically escaped prison. Two weeks later, an IED blast rocks Davao city, home of the president who’s in the middle of the war against drugs.

Go figure.

5th Suspect: United States Government

The United States has been very critical of the Duterte Administration’s war on drugs, going as far as insinuating that Duterte has a hand in the vigilante killings that has plagued the latter’s government for the past couple of months.

Just last week, its pro-war Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power tweeted, “Alarming reports of ongoing extrajudicial killings in #Philippines; government must respect human rights and rule of law [Power]”.

Duterte is the first president since God-knows-when who took a neutral stance on the US-China rift. Since the South China Sea ruling, we have seen how Duterte chronically refused to definitively side with either. This is a welcome development for China in light of the severely antagonistic Aquino Administration.

But this is alarming for the US, as it has always been used to having Philippine presidents who are willing to kiss its ass on command. Vice-president Leni Robredo along with her political party is very much pro-US, and it would be theoretically more convenient for the Americans to have Robredo as president instead.

So why not do something to catalyze Duterte’s political demise?

The communist New People’s Army also blames the US for the Davao Bombings [Inq], but I do not want to give much credence to them, because the communists love to blame the US for everything. Besides, many Filipinos would scream, “But the US is not a terrorist!”

However, an incident from the relatively recent past suggests otherwise.

Michael Terrence Meiring

Meiring, a US citizen, was sharing a hotel room in Davao City with his ammonium nitrate bomb, which exploded on May 16, 2002. Meiring was severely injured; nevertheless, US government agents appeared at the hospital and spirited him away, first to Manila and then to the United States [AsiaTimes].

The Davao City Prosecution Office alleged that Meiring was a terrorist bomber [MindaNews], but the courts weren’t able to proceed with the case because Meiring has already been whisked out of the country by the US government itself before he can be arraigned.

"It was early in the morning when (then-US Amb.) Ricciardone flew here and met with me in a hotel here. He assured me then that they will conduct an investigation regarding the Meiring incident. Yet since then, the US government failed to fully explain to me how come they violated our sovereign right to prosecute Meiring who committed a crime here in our city," Duterte said in 2011 [Tesiorna].
Basically, in 2002, the US government coddled a terrorist who actually attempted to terrorize Davao City. So yes, the idea of US involvement in the 2016 Davao City Bombing is not far-fetched.


6th Suspect: Chinese Government

Another angle would be planted evidence, an angle that the opposition oh-so-gloriously loves to ignore when it’s convenient for them. This theory is pretty simple: the Chinese Government bombs Davao City and make it appear as if the United States did it, thereby tilting Duterte’s stance on the China-US spat.

The problem with this theory, however, is that it's unlikely.

FIRST, because China is not widely-known for state-sponsored terrorism. Aside from a CATO Institute article insinuating otherwise, there’s little documented evidence that China actually does that.

SECOND, because if it backfires, then China is toast. That is, the risks outweigh the benefits. If China indeed bombed Davao City and local investigators confirm this, then it’s over for PH-China relations for the foreseeable future, and it may even be used as a justification for a more decisive Western military presence in the South China Sea.

That’s something that China doesn’t want, especially since they see Duterte as a bright spot for often-strained PH-China ties. I cannot imagine how China can be desperate enough to do it, so they probably didn’t.

ThinkingPinoy’s Takeaways


These six potential suspects listed in this article are just theories and this article does not, in any way, definitively blame any of these six. Instead, I wrote this article to help you understand that the situation is not as simple as “De Lima did it!”. In as much as I want that woman to burn in hell, hasty generalizations are not my cup of tea.

So, who do you think did it?[ThinkingPinoy]


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